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I

HERBERT HOOVER - AN EVALUATION

Seldom, if ever, in the history of the United States, has a
sident assumed office under more favorable conditions and with
achievement than did Herbert Hoover on

4, 1929.

In more or less specific contrast to his prede-

cessors, Warren G. Harding and Oalvin Ooolidge, he had but limited political experience to recommend him, so it was as an exadministrator that he was elected.

1

Throughout the first

rId War he had served the country both at home and abroad in
2

a.dministrative positions.

From close personal contacts he had

come to know the American people with a sympathetic, understanding
a.nd to have an appreciation of the problems of foreign peoples as
3
1.
During the Presidential campaign he had been portrayed as
"a superman whose engineering genius would reform and elevate the

1 Harold J. Laski, The American Presidency, !n Interpretation (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1940), 132.

2 This refers to the positions he held as Ohairman of the
erican Oommission for the Relief of Belgium from 1914 to 1917;
United States Food Administrator in 1917 and 1918; and Director
General of the American Relief Administration in the months following the Armistice in November, 1918. A detailed explanation
1s given in Appendix A.

3 Ashman Brown, "The Real Hoover,tI The Forum, 84: 290,
ovember, 1930.

2
))4

art of government.

As Secretary of Oommerce during the Harding

and Ooolidge administrations, he had been an "integral part of'
the government."

5

Here he had instituted significant changes and

bad gained a reputation as "a stickler for business and adminis6
trative efficiency.rf
Working closely with leaders of finance,
~usiness,

and industry, he had built up the economic structure of

the nation, which led to a period of unprecedented prosperity.

4 Orphaned at the age of ten, Hoover's childhood was one of

~eprivation and hard
~r in 1884.)
Due in

work. (His father died in 1880 and his mothpart, no doubt, to his early hardships, he
[determined to make something of himself through his own efforts.
pyer the protests of his Quaker relatives, with whom he had made
~is home after the death of his parents, he registered in the en~ineering course at the newly opened Leland Stanford Junior 001~ege in 1891.
It was necessary for him to work his way through
pollege and even at this early period of his life he established
~ record for accomplishment.
Upon his graduation in the pioneer class in 1895, he served
pis apprenticeship at the practical work of mining engineer in
~evada Oounty, Oalifornia.
Having proved that he was capable of
~reater responsibility, he sought wider fields for the practice of
~is chosen profession.
His reputation as a mining expert brought
pim assignments in South Wales and later in China. His interest
~nd skill in developing mines led the Hoovers (before going to
phina he married Miss Lou Henry, a Oalifornia girl whom he had met
~t Leland Stanford) to obscure corners of the earth, including
~ustralia, Africa, Mexico, Burma (India), and any place where
~here were mines to be worked.
Wherever there were special prob~ems in mining engineering, his advice was sought. Living among
~any peoples, he gained a personal knowledge of many governments
~nd of world affairs.--Vernon Kellogg, Herbert Hoover, the Man ~
~. Work (New York: D. Appleton and Oompany, 1920), 17-32; 45-49;
~9-7a;-g0-101; 102-123; and Mary R. Parkman, Heroes of Today (New
~ork: The Century Company, 1917), 305-309.

5 Roy V. Peel and Thomas C. Donnelly,

~ ~

~nalvsis (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc.,

Campaign - An

1935), 4.

6 Frederick A. Ogg and P. Orman Ray, Introduction to American
lovernment (New York: D. Appleton Oentury Company, 19321: 380.

3

Already famous both at home and abroad for his record ot
achievements, the American electorate looked to him for an administration of unequalled accomplishments.

"Here," according to

Oharles Evans Hughes, "was the perfect leader."

In an address in

st. Joseph, Missouri, during the 1928 campaign, Hughes told the
people:
• • • if any difficult situation
should arise, the one man who more
than anyone else could be depended
upon to bring the widest knowledge
and the greatest resourcefulness
to the devisin~ ot means to meet
the emergency would be Herbert Hoover.

7

This opinion finds support in a statement by another authority:
Here is a man long experienced in
leading masses of humanity in public and private enterprise, familiar with all the world--not merely
with his own section ot it--and
skilled in the art of getting men
to do as he wants them to do. This
art is the art of leadership, whether it be political leadership or business leadership. 8
Regarding his ability a well-known press correspondent in Washi
ton in 1930 commented:
Always he was the quiet unspectacular organizer, conCiliator, and
administrator. His reputation and
genius became legendary among his
countrymen. 'Let Hoover do it' had

7 Peel,

4.

8 Brown, 290.

4

become a national byword.

9

The student of history must keep constantly aware that,
man had ever taken the office of President of the United
more auspicious record of attainments and with a
detailed knowledge of government, yet--paradoxically enoughPresident since Ulysses S. Grant possessed less actual politiThe office of Secretary of Commerce--while it
knowledge of government--is regarded as "almos
if not absolutely, the least political of the executive depart10
ants. II In a study on American government Hoover is described as
11
ing in reality "a novice in politics."
Despite an auspicious beginning, it transpired that the year
that Hoover served as the thirty-first President of the United
States comprise an era that is recognized as one of the most cri
cal in our history.

Events unforeseen in the spring of 1929

laced upon him burdens such as few executives have had to assume
12
in times of peace. His task from the beginning became one of

9 Robert S. Allen, IfHoover--Manager of United States,1f World

I~~.'

55:234, February, 1930.

10 Wilfred E. Binkley, President and Congress (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947), 227.
11 Ogg, 286.
12 Charles Merz, "Hoover's First Three Years, If The New York
Sunday, February 28, 1932, Section IX, 3.
Herbert Corey, The Truth About Hoover (Boston: Houghton
fflin Company, 1932), 3.

I~~~'

6

5

13
less emergencies.

Public interest centered in his dealings with Congress, and

14

it was here that misunderstandings oocurred.

Faced with a crisis

the serious aspects of which fell just short of the consequences
of war--the sudden collapse of the stock market in the fall of

1929 and the subsequent depression and period of unemployment--he
seemed wholly incapable of assuming the leadership of Congress in
the emergency.

15

From close personal association with the Presi-

dent, Theodore G. Joslin, who was his secretary from 1931 to 1933
has observed in his writings: "None of his acts aroused that fire
of enthusiasm sufficient to cause them to follow his leadership

16

unquestionably."

His inability to assume this leadership was de-

rived, in part, no doubt, from his aooeptance of a rigorous oonoept of the separation of powers, the basis for whioh is found in
his pronounced individualism.

17

An apt statement of this concept

is found in Hoover's own words, where he deolared:
• • • the weakenin~ of the legislative
arm 20f governmen~1 leadLi? to enoroachment by the executive upon the legisla-

13 Theodore G. Joslin, Hoover Q!f the Record (New York:
Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1934), 13.
14 Brown, 291.
15 Laski, 132.
16 Joslin, 13.
17 Laski, 132.

See footnote 23 in Chapter II.

6
tive and judicial functions and inevitably that encroachment is upon
individual liberty • • • the militant safeguard to liberty • • • L1,s7
• • • legislative independence. 18
Authorities are agreed that, while he approached his tasks
a zeal and sincerity rarely surpassed, he was frequently mis
erstood and his accomplishments misjudged because of dominant
rsonal traits.

His policy of silence, his sensitiveness to per
and his inability to interpret himself and his

those outside of immediate associates formed handicaps so
serious that they became the focal point from which stemmed antag
onism and widespread dissatisfaction.

19

Joslin has declared that his silence was close to the root
of the antagonisms that developed against him.

Because of it the

can people neither understood the chaotic conditions during
s administration, nor were they cognizant of the untiring efforts he was making to alleviate distress.

When urged to publi-

cize certain trying situations, his inevitable reply was:
is not a showman's job.

This
20
I will not step out of character." A

18 Herbert Hoover, The Challenge 1Q
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934), 125-126.
19 Joslin, 2-13.

Liber~

If

(New York:

A professor of history at the University of Michigan has
said of Hoover, "~e7was the most sensitive to criticism of any
man in public life.~--Dwight Lowell Dumond, Roosevelt to ~~~~~
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1937), 383.
Specific instances of these characteristics will be found
in succeeding chapters.
20 Joslin, 2.

7
student of political science has described one of his personal
bandicaps in these words:
It Lias hi~7absence of the common
toucb that was largely responsible for
the defeat of Mr. Hoover. He was full
of good-will; he worked relentlessly at
his task. But he never gave his constituents the impression of entering into
their problems upon the plane on which
they encountered them. 21
ThiS inability to convey his real feelings to the people outside
of his intimate assooiates is pertinent because of the confidence
22
and loyalty whioh he inspired in his colleagues. He was at his
best, we are told, when dealing with small groups of men.

To

these limitations of character, not previously known, and to his
political philosophy is attributed in large part the lack of understanding between the President and Congress that became apparent in the first year that Herbert Hoover directed the affairs of
23
the nation.
A study of the facts of Hoover's life affords ample evidence
that his emotional attitudes and philosophy were alike the result
of the influence of his religion and bis early environment.

Born

into a Quaker home in West Branch, Iowa, of a long line of Quaker
ancestors on August 10, 1874, he was reared, both at home and at

21 Laski, 36.
22 Joslin, 2-13.
23
July, 1930.

, "Hoover Has Failed,1t The World Tomorrow, 13: 291,

8

Obo ol , in an atmosphere that favored the formation of an individ
s
24
ualistic philosophy. In the Hoover home, as in other Quaker home
tbe children and their parents shared in the performance of tasks
and in the enjoyment of the homely pleasures afforded by the rou25
tine activities and social life of the household. By placing
greater emphasis upon the needs and aspirations of the individual
than upon the sUbject-matter, the Quaker schools had an individu26
alizing effect on the group.
From his childhood training stems, in some degree, his seDse
justice and fair play in business.

The welfare of peoples who

treated unfairly because of race, creed, or color held more
than a passing interest for the Quakers.

They held to the convi

tion that all transaotions in business should be tempered by a
e of justice and equity.

In the Quaker principle that a def-

relationship exists between the eoonomic order and human
Ifare is found an explanation for the economic policies of the
resident.

27

In the Quaker meeting-house that the young Hoover attended
in the prosperous and quiet community of West Branoh, his mother,

24 Vernon Kellogg, Herbert Hoover, the Man and His Work (New
rk: D. Appleton Company, 1920), 12-15.
25 There were two other children in the Hoover family--a
ther Theodore, who was three and one-half years older than He
ert, and a younger sister, Mary.--Ibid., 16.
26 Walter Friar Dexter, Herbert Hoover and American
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932r;-54-58.
~~~~
Dexter

L

rr=

.

So

mini ster, sometimes addressed the congregation.

~as

9

28
This

hers by virtue of her unusual mental gifts, her spiritual in

sight, and her moral courage.

She was in reality, "a religious
2

individualist," not a pastor in the common meaning of the word.
Freedom of conscience was a dominant ideal of the Society of
Friends.

Their meetings allowed a liberal amount of freedom, re

quiring at the same time a social responsibility.

Anyone who be

lieved in the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man could

,e

a member of this organization.

This friendly idealism both

stimulated and dominated the activities of Hoover's childhood and
30
youth.
Without an appreciation of this phase of his religious
training, Hoover's philosophy of American individualism cannot be
31
properly understood. Regarding it, Walter Friar Dexter has written: "Failure to understand his philosophy of friendship leads

28 Hoover's mother, Hulda Minthorn Hoover, has been described by people who knew her as being unusually shy and reserve
in spite of her color and attractiveness.--Kellogg, 15. These
traits are obviously an honest legacy of her son, Herbert Hoover.
29 "A minister, in the SOCiety of Friends, carried the title
in recognition of his spiritual gifts rather than in recognition
of a professional or educational training in religious technique.'
--Dexter, 26.
30 Dexter, 27.
31 "An American individualist is a person, who, having
learned the intrinsic value of man and having found within himself an inescapable desire to know right relationships, has developed a spirit of gratitude, an attitude of tolerance, and a
social mind, to all of which he gives expression in an inclusive
program of friendly service."--Dexter, 110.

10

32
misinterpretation of his idea of individualism."
the ideal of service inherent in the philosophy of the

That

~uakers

.ad e a lasting impression upon the convictions of the young Hoo~er

is brought out in the following quotation:
He learned from ibis Quaker ancestori7that men are not mere abstractions; .that they are individual units
of a social order. Among them he experienced individualism raised to a high
level of mutual interdependence. Association with them gave him a sense of
social progress through individual
growth and achievement. He developed a
patriotically and spiritually motivated
faith in this type of structural framework, which is at once dynamiC and practical. It fints expression in much that
he thinks and does for the people whom
he serves.
33
Of the influence of the Quaker religion on his life and work

David Hinshaw--in an article entitled "Friends of the Truth"--has
given the following analysis:
Hoover the Quaker, given to reticence, distinctly modest, quick in sJ!mpathy for the oppressed, with great
strength and instinctive gentleness, and
with astounding audacity of the spirit
is full of the manners and methods of
this peculiar people. He does not represent Quakerism in its rigid interpretation, but the indelible impressions
of childhood have matured into a manhood
concerned with the things of the spirit
and the fiber of that spirit makes it
pliable but unbreakable.
34

32 Dexter, 27.
33
3

Ibi~.,

60.
w, "Friends of the Truth, It The Century, 120:

l

11

From men intimately associated with the President during
tb8Se trying years we learn that, in spite of his inherent shynes
and inevitable reserve, few of our chief executives have ever desired companionship and friendship more sincerely than Hoover.

35

explanation of this seeming paradox in his nature is timely

Onto the acquired shyness of a Quaker

Lh!7pile~ the shyness of a growing

boy whose feelings are so exquisitely
acute that he fears to show a~ of
them lest he show all • • • LThi~7 dual
shyness, combined with his own ideas of
taste in conduct, long kept him a mystery to the public.
36

Because of the miBunderstandings that oOcurred during his
administration, Herbert Hoover has been called the most criticiz
37
President since Lincoln. A man of many contrasts--neither "sup
man" nor "a 1{Orking machine"--he labored oonscientiously in spite
of assaults to forward the polioies in which he believed.

38

Sinoe

the kind of man the President shows himself to be bears an intimate relation to the power and meaning that he gives his offioe,
and since the fulfillment of his program depends upon his relationships with Congress, a knowledge of these facts is signifioant.

35 Joslin, 6-7.
36 Will Irwin, "Herbert Hoover, an Intimate Portrait," The

I~~~~

MagaZine, 109: 126, May, 1930.

37 Notable examples of criticism leveled at the President
be brought out in the suoceeding chapters.
38 Joslin 5-6.

II
FROM CONFIDENCE TO CONFUSION
The Hoover administration had its inception in the midst of
an era of unprecedented stock speculation.

1

Warnings from econom-

iO experts regarding the precarious state of the stock market
failed to shake the President's confidence in the stability of
the postwar prosperity.

He held to the conviction that the sys-

tem of free enterprise in the United States would soon eradicate
2
poverty. In his inaugural address he gave expression to this co
fidence when he said:
If we survey the situation of our nation both at home and abroad, we find many
satisfactions; we fin~ some causes for concern. We have emerged from the losses of
the Great War with increased virility and
strength. From this strength we have contributed to the recovery and progress of
the world. • •• In the large view we have
reached a higher degree of comfort and seourity than ever existed before in the history of the world. • • •
Ours is a land rich in resources,
stimulating in its glorious beauty, filled
with millions of happy homes, blessed with
comfort and opportunity • • • • In no nation
are the fruits of accomplishment more secure. I have no fears for the future of
our country. It is bright with hone.
3
1 William starr Myers and Walter H. Newton, The Hoover ~===
istration. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sone, 1936), 14. In
the succeeding pages this work will be referred to as Myers.
2 Binkley, 233.

3 William Starr Myers, The State Papers and Other Public
Writings of Herbert Hoover. -rGarden City, New York: Doubleday,
Doran and Company, 1934), Vol. I, 3, 12. In the succeeding pages
this work will be referred to as State Paners.
12

13
to his philosophy of government is found in the presentatiO n of his views on self-government:

Our people have in recent years developed a new-found capacity for cooperation among themselves to effect high purposes in public welfare. It is an advance
toward the highest conception of selfgovernment. Self-government does not and
should not imply the use of political agencies alone. Progress is born of cooperation in the community--not from governmental
restraints.
4
Strangely enough, in spite of the optimistic outlook of the
resident, the major issues of this administration were precipitated by a business depression which constituted the gravest economic crisis ever experienced by the American people, following
the collapse of the stock market in October of the inaugural
5
year. Problems requiring legislative action during his earliest
months in office dealt with farm relief, tariff revision, and law
enforcement.

It is with these issues and with the cumulative

problems arising from the economic crisis beginning in October,

1929, and continuing through the four years of the Hoover administration that this discussion will be concerned.
The dispatch with which President Hoover treated the problem
confronting him in his first few weeks in office, including his
selection of capable men for the Cabinet, the fulfilment of camaign pledges and the establishment of amicable relations with

4 State Papers, 7.

5 Merz, 3.

14
the press, augured well for his success and popu1 rit y and charac
ter1 zed him at

6
the outset as an active President. In an address

the Gridiron Olub on April 13, a few days before the call1ng of the special session of Oongress, President Hoover explai
h1s v1ews on the relationship between the Executive and Oongress.
S1nce his statement on this occasion of the concept he held of
the r1ght and duty of Oongress was later used as the basis for un
favorable criticism, and since this concept had a vital bearing

6 Albert Bushnell Hart, The American Year Book, (New York:
American Year Book Oorporation, 1929), 9, 67.
Allan Nevins, "President Hoover's Record,1t Ourrent History
387-388, July 1932.
Myers, 12, 13.
The President announced his Oabinet members as follows:
Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of State;
Andrew W. Mellon,
Secretary of the Treasury;
James TN. Good,
Secretary of War;
William D. Mitchell,
Attorney-General;
WalterF. Brown,
Postmaster-General;
Oharles Francis Adams, Secretary of the Navy;
Ray Lyman Wilbur,
Secretary of the Interior;
Arthur M. Hyde,
Secretary of Agriculture;
Robert P. Lamont,
Secretary of Oommerce;
James J. Davis,
Secretary of Labor.
cretary Mellon and Secretary Davis were continued in the office
held in the Oabinet of President Ooolidge. The Senate promp
confirmed all nominations.
7 State Papers, I, 27.
On this same occaSion, the President paid tribute to the
ces of the Press, noted its importance in the process of
ernment--which he termed Ita government by opinion"--and stated
s desire to cooperate in making authoritative news available to
e public by twice-weekly press conferences.
With a touch of humor, the President also gave his version
f the fate of plain, well-intentioned statements when once ensted to the eager representatives of the Prese, an explanation
ich may well account for the fact that the reading public fretly got unfavorable and erroneous impressions of the Presi
of hi

44

"l

on bis subsequent relations with Congress, it should be noted
l1 ere :

• • • One of the important problems
of every President is the relationship between the Executive and Congress.
The mere fact that the founders
of the Republic provided checks and
balances in our governmental structure was never indicated as an invitation to those charged with different duties to constantly differ in
their views or to endeavor to shirk
responsibility on the shoulders of
others, and thus waste their own energies, time, and money in useless
controversy.
.
I know of no more able and devoted legislative body in the world
than our Con~ress. It is the right
and duty of Congress to investigate
and formulate legislation:
8 Both
the dignity of the two arms and the
efficiency of the whole Federal structure will be best served by mutual
recognition of each other's ri~hts and
responsibilities, and real progress is
made in both administrative and legislative arms by cooperation through
frank discussion, and by the temperate
exchange of views directly between the
Executive and the leaders of Congress,
out of which wise policies are evolved
and prudent courses are pursued.
I am well aware of the difficulties of 'a pro~ramme1of close cooperation. It is much less heroic for the
President to cooperate than to carry the
banner of the people against the bastions of Congress. To the extent that
each may be helpful to the other, it is
our duty to render unselfish assistance.
The object to be gained by cooperation within an administration between
the Administration and Congress, between
8

..reference to

this statement in footnote 14 and in

16
the Administration and the leaders
of our economic and social forces,
are not the pawns of politics; they
are not the headlines of the newspapers. They are the prosperity,
the contentedness, the moral, and
spiritual advancement of the American
people.
9
Of the problems requiring legislative action, to which reference has already been made, President Hoover seemed most concerned over that of disregard and disobedience of law, but he
gave prompt attention to all three.

Party pledges made during

the presidential campaign made the calling of a special session
10
of Congress to deal with farm relief obligatory. Accordingly,
the Seventy-first Congress was called in extraordinary session
on April 15, 1929, less than six weeks after the President assumed office.

On Tuesday, April 16, a message in writing from

the President was communicated to the House where a quorum of
both Houses was assembled.

Recommendations made at this time

included tariff readjustment, adjustment of production, and improved marketing.

In his opening remarks he stated:

I have called this special session of Congress <to redeem two pledges
given in the last election--farm relief
and limited changes in tariff.
There being no disagreement as to
the need for farm relief, the problem
before us becomes one of method by which

9 state Papers, I, 30.
10 Merz, 3.
Irwin, 17.
The American Year Book, 1929, 11.

17
relief may be most successfully brought
about.
11
believed that the rates on some agricultural products
should be increased but hoped to avoid the dangers of a fullscale
tariff revision.

What he wished from Congress at this time was

a revision upward of the agricultural schedule and a renewal of
executive authority to make the necessary adjustment in other
12
rates. In outlining his plan for farm relief, the President
stressed the fact that--since the agricultural depression result-

ed

from a great number of problems--no single plan or principle

could be generally applied.

He urged the creation of a farm

board, conposed of members qualified to analyze the farmer's situation and vested with sufficient authority to deal with his
13
problems. Excerpts from his message explaining the plan are not
worthy since the President was later credited by his critics with
saying within a month after his taking office that "since tariffmaking and farm relief were among the prerogatives of Congress,
he could not furnish anything like a detailed program of

11 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first session, 34.
12 Joslin, 30, 31.
13 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first session, 46, 47.

18

I have long held that the multiplicity of causes of agricultural depression could only be met by the creation of a great instrumentality clothed
with sufficient authority and resources
to assist our farmers to meet these
problems, each upon its own merit.
15

The creation of such an agency, he thought, would result in
constructive action, since it would take the agricultural ques
ut of politics and place it in the realm of economics.

This

Ian was further amplified in his message and emphasis placed on
is philosophy that no action should be taken by the government
t would infringe on individual liberty:
The pledged purpose of such a Federal farm board is the reorganization of
the marketing system on sounder and more
stable and more economic lines. • . • •
• • .Certain vital principles must be adhered to in order that we may not undermine the freedom of our farmers and of our
people as a whole by bureaucratic and governmental domination and interference. We

14 Binkley, 228.
"Less than a month after his inauguration he Dresident
.~nn~ro~7 was being criticized for announcing that since tariffaking and farm relief were among the prerogatives of Congress,
could not furnish anything like a detailed program of action."
e same statement appears in other critical works, but investiion has failed to reveal evidence that the President ever made
announcement attributed to him. The statement of the Presint from which this conclusion may have been drawn is quoted on
age 16 in this chapter. See also footnote 8 in this chapter.
Objection to this same statement was expressed by Repreentative Williams at the speoial session of the Seventy-first
ss in April, 1929. See pages 22 and 23 and footnote 22 in
chapter. See also footnote 37 in Chapter I.
15 state Paners, I, 34, 35.

19
must not undermine initiative. There should be no
fee or tax imposed upon the
farmer. No governmental
agency should engage in the
buying and selling and pricefixing of products, for such
courses can lead only to bureaucracy and domination.
Governmer-t funds should not
be loaned.
16
From the beginning of the special session of the Seventyfirst Congress, the President received the cooperation of the
House where the Republicans held a majority of one hundred and
one votes, but the reluctance of the Senate to go along with
the President was apparent early in the session and posed a real
difficulty in the regular session which convened December 2,

1929~

The Republicans in the Senate numbered fifty-six, but fourteen
were "Prop:ressive tl Republicans who threw their influence with
the thirty-nine Democrats and one Farmer-Labor member--forming a

16 State P§pers, I, 34, 35.

20
coalition of obstruction to the President.

17

Even the so-called

~Old

Guard", who numbered forty-two could not always be counted
18
on to cooperate.
The matter of farm relief was given prompt consideration.
In response to the President's message, a bill prepared by the
oommittee on Agriculture of the House designated as H. R. 1, was
reported to the House of Representatives by Representative Haug-

en, Republican of Iowa, Chairman of the Committee, on April 15
17 Myers, 32.
The American Year Book, 1929, 2.
Se~tor Robinson, Democrat of Arkansas, was chosen floor
leader of the Senate; Representative John N. Garner of Texas was
ohosen Democratic floor leader of the House and John W. Tilson
of Connecticut, Republican floor leader. Representative Nicho
Longworth, Republican of Ohio~ was chosen sneaker of the House.
William Allen White, 'Herbert Hoover,--The Last of the
Old Presidents or the First of the New?" ~aturday Evening Post,
205:7, March 4, 1933. The "Prop;ressive" Republicans came from
the Northwest, from the territory snreading south from Michigan
to Oklahoma and west to the coast. The President's inability to
win these men to him is attributed to certain "limitations of
oharacter" described as "a oertain deen integrity of self-respect" Lwhic1l7 "stayed his blandishing~ hand"" in dealing wi th
them; and to his "forthright quality"--acquired in part from his
business training--"which rejected what may be called the salacious quality of political equipment."
Binkley, 230. This group was at first deeply concerned
over the election of Hoover because "once more they feared to be
confronted with that greatest threat to their prestige, a President, elected as a 'popular idOl', intended as a strong leader
of the Jackson-Lincoln type." Many of the Republican Senators
regarded him as only a recent oonvert to Renublicanism and "henc
of doubtful party standing."
18 Myers, 32.
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19
and was printed in the Record on April 16.

The avowed purpose

of the bill was to provide for the establishment of a Federal
Farm Board to promote the effective merchandising of agricultural commodities and to place agriculture on a basis of economic
equality with other industries.

On April 18 discussion of the

bill was opened by Thomas S. Williams, Republican of Illinois,
whO called attention to salient features of the bill:

The aim of the bill is to finance
the farmers, to enable them through

19 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first session, 27, 49.
The bill declared it "to be the policy of Congress
(1) To promote the effective merchandising of agricul
al commodities in interstate and foreign commerce, SO that the
industry of agriculture will be placed on a basis of economic
equality with other industries; and
(2) to that end to protect, control and stabilize the
current or interstate and foreign commerce in the marketing of
agricultural commodities and their food products by minimizing
speculation, preventing inefficient and wasteful methods of distribution, and limiting undue and excessive price fluctuations;
by encouraging the organization of producers into cooperative as
sociations and promoting the establishment and financing of a
farm marketing system • • • by aiding in preventing and controlling surpluses in any agricultural commodity, through orderly
production and distribution" • • •
The bill further provided for the creation of a Federal
Farm Board to "consist of a chairman and five other members to
appointed by the President, by and with the advice of the Senate
and of the Secretary of Agriculture, ex offi~io" • • • The salary
of each appointed member was set at #12,000 a year, except the
chairman, whose salary was to be fixed by the President. This
board was to work with and in the interests of cooperative marketing associations. The board was to have at its disposal the
sum of $500,OOO,000--appropriated by Congress--to be used as a
revolving fund, for making loans and advances upon application
oooperative associations, for effective merchandising of agricul
tural commodities, the construction or acquisition of marketing
facilities, the formation of clearing house associations and for
8xtending the membership of the cooperative associations. This
done according to stipulations detailed in the bill

22

cooperative associations, organized
and controlled by them, in cooperation
with the board, to market their commodities in their own way, in other words,
to do as nrovided in the declaration of
policy. - 20
Opportunity to discuss the bill was given under the fivem1nute rule.

In opening the discussion Williams stated that the

prompt consideration of the bill evinced the purpose of Congress
to make good the campaign pledges of both the Democrat and
11can parties.

The bill, he further noted, represented the

thought and jUdgment 'of the Committee on Agriculture and was not
prepared on the outside by the Department of Agriculture.

This

was in accord with the expressed conviction of the President

that it was lithe constitutional duty of Congress to take the in21

1tiative in formulating legislation."

He stated his objections

to statements widely circulated at this time that the attitude
of the President indicated that he had no plan or definite ideas
as to the legislation necessary to cope adequately with the pro
22

1em at hand.

The President's adherence to the dogma of legisla-

tive independence--regarded by some as a corollary to his doctrine of individual liberty--was not interpreted by Williams as
an indication that President Hoover had no definite idea or poli
eies on the character of agricultural or tariff legislation

20 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first sesSion, 132.

21 Ibid., 124.
22 See footnote 14 in this chapter.

23
needed.

Regarding this he said:
The committee felt complimented
that he LPresident Hoover? gave it the
credit for having the capacity and the
good sense to draw a proper bill.
There was no justification for the
statement • • • that because the President recognized the proper relationship
between the executive and legislative
branches of the Government and insisted
on Congress performing its constitutional functions in formulating legislation,
he had no definite policies • • • of
legislation necessary to redeem the
pledges he and his party made during the
campaign.
23

In support of his view, Williams cited passages from two speeches of the President that set forth the same plan for farm relief
as explained by the President in his recent message to Congress.
These unequivocal statements, he countered, left little doubt as
2

to the exact nature of the legislation desired by the President.
In the House discussion that followed, conflicting opinions
on the merits of the bill were expressed, but on the whole, the
25
House supported the measure. Noteworthy was the attitude taken
by Representative Aswell, Democrat of Louisiana, House Minority
leader, in defense of President Hoover as well as of the measure

23 See footnote 17 in Chapter I.
Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first session, 124.
24 Ibid., 124, 125. These were at St. Louis, near the end
of the Presidential campaign, and in his speech of acceptance
when nominated for the Presidency of the United States.
25 Ibid., 124-131, 157-180, 451-484.

24
The bill has been as oarefully
studied and written as any measure
with whioh I have ever been oonneoted.
Farm legislation was drawn into the
reoent, national oampaign • • • • He
LFresident Hooveil made olear his position on the equalization fee. • ••
He deolared for sound and oonstruotive
legislation for the effeotive merohandizing of agrioultural oommodities.
This is his plan • • • I, for one, shall
help him put his ideas into law • • • •
I appeal to my Demooratio oolleagues to
support this measure without amendment.

26

Merits of the bill as well as the dispatoh of the President in
handling the matter were pointed out by Representative Goodwin,
Republioan of Minnesota, when he said:
The present bill, for the first
time in my memory will yield to the
farmer the right • • • to oontrol the
oommodity he produces • • • in an orderly manner. • • •
The stabilization oorporation
provision of the bill is one of the
strongest features of the bill in my
judgment • • • •
President Hoover is to be oommended for so promptly redeeming his
oampaign pledges to oall Congress into
a speoial session to deal with the agrioultural program. It is now up to Congress to do its part.
27
Analysis of the bill made by Representative Purnell, Republioan of Indiana, stressed the appropriateness of its provisions
and likewise expressed approval of the President's stand:

26 Congressional Reoord, Seventy-first Congress, first session, 129.

27 Ibid., 577, 578.

25
Congress is now dealing with the
most important question that any Congress or committee of Congress has ever
undertaken to solve since the beginning
of the government • • • •
The bill now presented • • • meets
the situation at hand.
In my judgment the best speech that
will be made for this bill will be found
in the President's message.
28
That the members of the House disagreed over the Administration
measure was apparent in the opinions expressed by Representative
Clarence Cannon, Democrat of Missouri, and Marion Jones, Democra
of Texas.

Cannon declared:
This bill is the greatest gold
brick ever handed to the American
farmer by' any Congress. • • • It fails
by every major test. • • • The program
of farm relief through farm tariffs, if
it is ever to be carried out, must be
carried out through this bill. And yet
there is not a line or a word in this
bill to redeem the pledge of the President and the Republican and Democratic
parties in the last election that the
farmer will be given the benefit of the
tariff. • ••
29

Jones, who favored the debenture plan advocated by the Senate,
was critical but less caustic in his remarks:
I regret exceedingly that I cannot
support the bill in its present form.
I am not going to throw any blocks in
the way of its passage • • • • I do not
believe it anything like aporoaches a
solution of the farm problem.

28 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first session, 131.
29 Ibid., 128.

26
If amended • • • to include the
debenture plan, I should be happy to
support it.
30
The Agricultural Marketing Bill, written substantially in acco

anc e with the President's ideas and without the debenture plan,
was voted on and passed by the House April 25, 1929, by a vote

of three hundred sixty-six yeas against thirty-five nays.

31

From the beginning of the deliberations over agricultural
relief, certain farm organizations and some of the progressive
senators urged upon the President the "Export Debenture-,Plan"-a plan which had not been mentioned during the 1928 campaign.

32

The Senate bill, known as S. 1, was introduced on April 18 in
same form as the House bill by Senator Charles McNary, Republioan from Oregon and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, but was revised to include this so-called export debenture

33

plan.

Its introduction at this time was looked upon as an ob-

structive measure since no mention of such a provision had been
made when the plan of principles for farm relief was drawn up by
the Republican Convention at Kansas City, and represented, there

30 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first sesSion, 130.
31 lbid,., 572.
32 Myers, 381.
Stat~ Paner~,

I, 39.

33 Congressional Record, Seventy.rirst Congress, first sesSion, 102, 1269, 1270, 2880.

27

to re ,

a complete departure from the party principles.

The

disapproved of the idea and--in compliance with a request

trom a small group of senators for his opinion--stated his obj
t10 ns , which were based upon an analysis made at his request by
the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture and Treasury, in a let-

34

tar dated April 20, 192 9, addressed to Senator McNary.

The plan

he observed, in addition to being a complete departure from the
principles discussed in the 1929 campaign, would require a substantial increase in taxes.

The issue and redemption of deben-

tures, if generally applied, would decrease the treasury receipt
by an amount in excess of $200,000,000 a year.

He believed that

"the theoretical benefits would not be reflected to the American
farmer; that it would create profiteering," and that it contai
3
provisions "which would bring American agriculture to disaster."

34 State Papers, I, 39.

The request came from Senators McNary, Capper, Heflin,
Norbeck, and Ransdall, acting as a sub-committee of the Senate
Committee on Agriculture.
35 State Papers, I, 39-42.
Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first sesSion, 2884.
•
-In his comments on the debenture plan Senator Caraway no
ted that it was not a new idea and explained the plan to the Se
ate members as follows:
The plan Simply provides, since farm products to
a large extent must find a market beyond our borders
where tariff protection cannot go, that for the commodity so exported, and, of course, denied any benefit from the tariff, fifty per cent of whatever rate
Congress thought was fair as a tariff protection on
such article shall be paid to the farmer on his products which had thus to be sold in the open mark~t of
the world.
For specific examples of how the plan would work, and fo
further explanation of the plan as given in the New York Times 0
June 10 1929 see Appendix C.

28

senator Borah, Republican from Idaho, who was chiefly retponsible for President Hoover's summoning of the special sessi
and one of the "Progressives" who made a determined stand for
the debenture plan on the theory that it would secure l1economlc
equality for agriculture", took issue with the President's objections and defended the Senate action when he said:
Something has been said and often
repeated in the Republican press to the
effect that the debenture 'plan was not
specifically discussed in the campaign,
as if that closed the controversy as
far as the Congress is concerned. But
the Republican party pledged itself to
the solution of the problem. Will anyone contend that if the solution is at
hand we are foreclosed by the fact that
it was not specifically discussed in
the campaign? • • • We were pledged to
solve the problem and that covers any
plan which will solve it.
36
In an exchange of views with Senator Edge, Mr. Borah further explained that "the curse of the Hoover bill was that it did so
37
little for American agriculture." Staunch supporters of the debenture plan in addition to Senator Borah included Senators Cop
land of New York, Fletcher and Trammell of Florida, Broussard of
Louisiana, Walsh of Massachusetts, Dill of Washington, Tydings
of Maryland, Carter Glass of Virginia, Caraway of Arkansas, and
Brookhart of Iowa.
36 New York Times, June 11, 1929.
Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first session, 2592.

37 New York Times, June 11, 1929.

29
In defense of the plan these men maintained that it would
tender additional assistance to depressed agriculture by giving
the farmer what amounts to a bounty on the farm product he exports; that it was not a subsidy--it would take no money out of
the Treasury; it would arrest the flow of money into the
tram customs' duties--and that it would serve, when in operation,
to replenish the revolving fund to be administered by the Fed
Farm Board.

Senator Tydings went so far as to say that any plan

that did not carry the debenture plan would result in "nothing
but extravagance, bureaucracy gone mad, and a raid upon the Fed38
eral treasury of approximately half a billion dollars." Among
the supporters of the Administration measure were Senators Van.
denburg of Michigan, Edge of New Jersey, and Allen, junior Senator from Kansas.
On May 4 the coalition of Democrats and Progressives voted
to adopt the Export Debenture Plan as a part of the Agricultural
Marketing Bill in spite of the President's professed disapproval.
The President in conference with Republican senators expressed
hope that the Senate opposition to the House bill would cease
temporarily so as to expedite passage of the measure, but the
Senate on May 13 passed the bill after striking out the House bil

38 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first sesSion, 2652.

39
provisions and inserting the text of the Senate Bill.

30
The bill

as then returned to the House where it was decided to send it
"
40
to conference. On June 5, after more than a week in deadlock,
the Senate and House conferees reached a decision to eliminate
the Export Debenture Plan.

The bill as reported by the oonferee

lI'as passed by the House on June 7, but the Senate refused to agree to the conference report by a vote a forty-seven to fortyfour, and--upon the insistence of the coalition group--requested
41
a second conference to consider the debenture plan.
Regarding the motives of the senators who gave their suppo
to the debenture plan the New lork Times, on the eve of this co
ference, commented:
The question which agitates Congress
and which will be in the back of the heads
of most of the Democratic Senators who attend the conference will not be whether the
debenture is right or wrong, but what effect support or opposition to it will have
on party prospeots in next year's Congressional election and the election over the
Presidency in 1932.
42
39 Year Book, 1929, 11.
Myers, 387, 388.
In other particulars the Senate Bill was at variance
with the President's ideas. Briefly it included the export debenture amendment and utilized the cooperatives but laid more
phasis on the Farm Board and Stabilization Corporation and their
activities, while the "House Bill stressed the farm cooperatives,
requiring the Farm Board to work through them and largely on
their initiative.
40 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first sesBion, 1455.
41 Myers, 390, 391.
Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first session, 2870, 2887, 2894, 2938.
42 New York Times, June 10, 1929.
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31
Distressed over the delay caused by the Senate, the President at this juncture issued a public statement in which he expressed disappointment over the Senate's refusal to consider the
oonferees' bill--an action which he felt might seriously jeopardize the enactment of the bill--and again condemned the debenture plan:
• • • No matter what the theory of the
export subsidy may be, in the practical
world we live in, it will not bring equality but will bring further disparity to agriculture. It will bring immediate profits to some speculators and
disaster to the farmer.
43
Views expressed in the Republican Press that the stand taken on
the debenture plan was an attempt to embarrass the President met
vigorous protests from some of the Democratic senators.

Senator

Walsh, who disapproved of both the conferees' and the debenture
plans, stoutly defended his colleagues:
There is no effort here to embarrass in
any way the passage of some kind of farm
relief bill. • • . Rare~y has there been
a measure in this body that had behind
it more of the spirit of crusaders than
that motivating those who supported the
debenture;plan. 44
That politics was a major consideration of many of the senators in their decisions on the agricultural relief
charged in the New York

~imes

pro~ram

was

when it was said:

43 Myers, 392.

The President's statement was issued on June 11, 1929.

44 Qongressional Recorq, Seventy-first Congress, first sesBion, 2649.
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In spite of claims to the contrary,
there is no doubt that the Democratic
•
leaders of the Senate have sought to
make the debenture a party matter. • •
Some of the senators who were opposed to the debenture on principle
yielded to the argument that in snite
,of the opinion exnressed in the conference, party loyalty demanded that
the Democratic side'of the Senate should
present a solid front.
45
But this charge was resented and vehemently denied by Senator
Copeland, one of the Democratic senators represented as voting
for the debenture solely because·of party loyalty, and by other
Democratic members.

Senator Copeland stated:

There have been many disagreeable
things in the Press about members of
the Senate who have seen fit to favor
the debenture. We have been accused
of playing nolitics--flpeanut politics"-at the expense of the American farmer.
• • • So far as I am concerned, however,
I have no desire to embarrass the President; I am not plaving politics; and
any intimation to the contrary • • . is
a cowardly insinuation.
46
Senator Robinson, Democratic floor leader who stated earlie
that the Democratic senators wished to proceed in an orderly way
with all matters brought before the speCial session, decaared at
this time also that the advocates of the debenture plan had not
delayed longer than was necessary to secure fair consideration

'45 New York Times, June 10, 1929.
46 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first session, 2649-2651.
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{Or the provisions for which they stood.

It was his conviction

tbat the measure without the debenture nlan did not fulfill the
~
47
pledges made in the Platform Plank of 1928. The President's
policy of seeking advice from experts before deciding on action
'las ridiculed by Senators Caraway and Brookhart.

Senator Cara-

'lay, who claimed that President Hoover's reply to a delegation
of senators who went to him for his views was: "I do not know

anything about it," referred to President Hoover as the "master
mind fl who said he would take his opinions from Secretary of Agri
oulture Hyde--whom Caraway insinuated didn't have an opinion of
hiS own--and from Secretary of the Treasury Mellon, whom Caraway
admitted was a man of great ability in his own field but not an
48
expert on farm problems. In Senator Brookhart's remarks the
President was aooused of negleot in dealing with the farm problem:
Herbert Hoover said in his speeoh
of aooeptanoe that this farm problem was
the greatest problem of the Amerioan people. I think • • • it should have had
more of his attention and I think it has
been negleoted and turned over to maohine
politios.
49

47 Congressional Reoord, Seventy-first Congress, first sesSion, 2871. Senator RObinson's statement was made on June 14,
the day the Senate approved of the bill without the debenture
amendment.
48 Ibid., 2658.
See footnote 34 in this ohapter.

49 Congressional Reoord, Seventy-first Congress, first sesSion, 2650.
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When the House, on June 13, again refused by a vote of two
hundred fifty to one hundred thirteen to approve the debenture
plan, the Senate on the following day yielded to the President's
"lshes and passed the Agricultural Marketing Bill by a vote 'of
seventy-four to eight.

The bill in its final form created the
50
Federal Farm Board but omitted the "Export Debenture iPlan." The
aotion of the Senate was explained by Senator Dill of Washington
"ho, like many other senators, expressed dissatisfaction with
the bill:
There is this to be said about it,
at least it is some kind of farm legislation • • • the form in which it goes
to the White House is due to the fact
that it is the only kind of a bill the
Congress feels the President will sign.
• • • Instead of Senators supporting
the debenture to embarrass the President,
it could now properly be said that Senators have opposed the debenture because
the President asked them to. • . . 51
Thus recognition of the President's victory in this--the
first controversy between the Executive and Congress--was admitted even by the Senators themselves.

Doubtless the President

was gratified over this gesture of cooperation signified by the
passage of the bill in substantially the same form as advocated

50 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first sesBion, 2886, 2935.
Among the eight who voted against the bill were Senators
LaFollette of Wisconsin, Caraway of Arkansas, Copeland of New
York, Walsh of Massachusetts, and Wheeler of Montana. Thirteen
members did not vote.
51 Ibid., 2881.
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bY

the Administration.

However, opposition enoountered during

tbe deliberation in the Senate must have given some indioation
of the rooky poli tioal road ahead, and may have given the President oause to wonder if the "hands off tt polioy in dealing with a
congress where his own politioa1 leadership was not strong would
~ork

in aotua1 praotioe.

The bill was signed by President HOOT

on June 15, 1929, at whioh time he expressed his satisfaotion
~hen

he remarked:
After many years of oontention we
have at last made a oonstruotive start at
agrioultural relief with the most important
measure ever passed by Congress in aid of a
single industry.
52
With the tariff problem Congress made even less rapid prog-

ress and showed even greater reluotanoe to oooperate with the
President.

In his first message to the speoial session, Presi-

dent Hoover urged a limited revision of rates in keeping with

52 Myers, 393, 394.
As a result of a oanvass of farmers' organizations and
agriou1tural oolleges, oonduoted by Seoretary of Agriou1ture
Hyde, for their views on qua1ifioations for membership on the
era1 Farm Board, President Hoover appointed the following members: Alexander Legge of Chioago, president of the International Harvester Company, ohairman;
James C. Stone, Kentuoky, founder and former president
of the Burley Tobaooo Growers' Co-operative Assooiation
Carl Williams, Oklahoma, of the Farmers' Co-operative
Assooiation;
C. B. Denman, Missouri, of the National Livestook Produoer
Assooiation;
Charles S. Wilson, New York, professor of agrioulture,
Cornell University;
William F. Sohilling, Minnesota, of the National Dairy
Assooiation;
Ex-Governor Samuel MoKe1vie, Nebraska; and
C. C. Teague, California of California Fruit Growers'Assn

1928 platform in which the Republican party was committed to an
e in agricultural tariffs and a moderate revision of in1porea S
53
tariff. He believed that tariff duties should be maintaiped that would represent the difference between cost of production at home and abroad, that they should be effectively fl
1ble to changing economic conditions, and that tariff fixing
should be placed in the hands of a bi-partisan tariff commission
54
with power to determine rates.
He favored a continuance of the Tariff Commission which had
functioned since 1922, but recommended basic changes in its organization that would take tariff-making out of politics--namely
to leave to the discretion of the President, with the approval
of the Senate, the appointment of seven commissioners rather
than limiting him to three from each party.

He believed that

secondary changes in tariff could be acted upon by the commissi
which would give more security to industry.

Congress was urged

to take into consideration the broad interests of the country as
a whole including our trade relations with other countries as
well as the needs of agrioulture:
• • • An effective tariff upon agricul-

53 Myers, 388.
State Papers, I, 31.
54 Ray Lyman Wilbur and Arthur Masteck Hyde, The Hoover Pol
iCies, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937), 181.
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tural products, that will compensate
the farmers' higher costs and higher
standards of living, has a dual purpose. LIt7not only protects the farmer in our domestic market, but it also
stimulates him to diversify his crops
and to grow products that he could not
otherwise produce, and thus lessens
his dependence upon exports to foreign
markets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• • . • the test of necessity for revision is • • • whether there has been a
substantial slackening of activity in
an industry • • . and a consequent decrease of employment due to insurmountable competition in the products of
that industry.
55
A new tariff bill known as H. R. 2667 was reported in the
House on Mav 9 by the Committee on Ways and Means.

56

Changes had

been made in from fifteen to twenty per cent of the items in the
existing schedule--changes that Hoover thought could have been
better considered by the new Tariff Commission.

The President

had hoped, not only for a limited revision and a flexible tariff
clause, but also that the measure would be disposed of summarily
by the House, where the rules made it possible to limit debate,
but the Republican extremists and the free trade advocates in the
House opposed the moderate policy of the President.

Lengthy dl

cussion, prompted by sectional as well as partisan feeling, led

55 State Paners, I, 35, 36.
56 Myers, 387. This committee under Chairman Hawley had
concluded its hearings in the previous short session of Congress.

38
to extensive hearings covering hundreds of items and delayed ac57
tiO n on the bill. Among those upon whom the President relied
support were Republican representatives Longworth of Ohio, Sp

er of the House, Treadway of Massachusetts, and Snell of New
york, while the opposition included such prominent leaders as
Democratic Representatives Garner of Texas and Rainey of Illinoi
To expedite passage of the bill, President Hoover summoned
House leaders into conference at the White House where he urged
an early vote on the measure and pOinted out that a bill containing a flexible tariff clause would take care of mistakes and
work out later injustices.

Subsequently oertain reduotions were

made in the proposed tariff rates, but in its final form the
measure still contained rates that were too high in the opinion
of the President.

It did, however, oarry out his recommendation

regarding membership on and salary increases for the Tariff Commission, but made changes in the flexible tariff provision.

The

new bill required an adjustment of tariff duties by the Preside
on the basis of equality of competitive conditions in the principal domestic markets rather than on the basis of equality of

57 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Con~ress, first sesSion, 1235, 1273, 1274-1279. A typical argument was that advanced by Representative Snow, Republican from Maine, who de_
clared that he was proud to be a Republioan and was anxious to
follow the Republican leadership of men like Longworth, Tilson,
and Snell, but inasmuch as the Special Session had been oalled
for the avowed purpose of giving aid to the farmers, and the potato farmers in his district were getting no relief, he could
Bupport the bill.

I i
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58

produotion.

59

The bill was passed by the House on May 28.

partisan oritioism, noticeably on the inorease, during the
Souse debates on the tariff, was observed an.d condemned by
adway when he remarked:
As disoussion of this bill has progressed, it has been quite remarkable to
see the Democratic Members returning to
their old methods of partisan criticism.
In view of the representations made by
the Democrats during the campaign last
fall, it was expected that, if those representations were sincere, a tariff bill
would not have the same element of partisanship in debate as had previously been
oustomary_ Unfortunately this has not
~roven to be the case, and the Democrats
are running true to form in abusing what
the people will eventually decide to be
the best tariff bill ever written. The
bill is such a good one and will be of
such ultimate benefit to the country at
large that it is right and fair that
those who are directly responsible for
its preparation and passage should reoeive their full share of credit for its
accomplishment.
60
The new tariff bill was referred to the Committee on Fin&noe in the Senate on June 11, where the debates over revision
were so prolonged that action on the measure dragged on into the

58 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first sesSion, 1284, 1285.
In theory the flexible tariff clause in the tariff law of
1922 had proven to be an excellent one, but in operation it had
been impractical; the length of time required for an investigation had nullified the value of the findings, aocording to testimony given by Representative Treadway.

59 Myers, 391.
60 ~ongreSSiOnal Record, Seventy-first Congress, first sesBion, 12 8.
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regular session of Congress instead of being consummated d
the Special Session as the President had wished.

Motives of

eident Hoover in recommending certain changes in the adminislaw as well as the methods he used in prosuch revisions aroused partisan criticism by ftepublican
ssives as well as Democrats and created, at what might be
the outset of the Administration, an unhappy situation for
the new President.
Controversy centered on the flexible tariff clause, the reuest of the President for revision of the Tariff Commission on a
partisan basis--with power to revise schedules, and changes
the industrial schedule under consideration by the Senate.
two the President remained adamant in his
Efforts to win the support of Senator Borah, who
disapprove of the Administration proposals from the time the
61
11 was introduced, were of no avail. When conferences with
ther Senate leaders failed to bring the Senate into accord, the
sident resorted to a Press statement in September, in which he
fended his stand on both the flexible tariff and the administr

61 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first session, 2779.
A resolution was introduced by Senator Borah on June 18,
929, to limit the hearings and recommendations of the Finance
ommittee on the bill, H. R. 2667, to agriculture and related
chedules. This was more restrictive than President Hoover rec
ed. The proposal failed by a vote of 38 to 39.
Myers, 397.

on's changes in the Oommission, and admitted that there will a
be injustices in tariff laws, due in part to changing e
conditions.

He left no doubt as to his convactions when he

• • • I have no hesitation in saying
that I regard it as of the utmost importance in justice to the public; as
a sound protection for the sound progress in our economio system, and for
the future proteotion of our farmers
and our industries and our consumers
that the flexible tariff, through recommendations of the Tariff Oommission
to the Executive, should be maintained.

62

maintained that the principle of the flexible tariff would be
troyed if recommendations were referred to Oongress for action.
s he made clear when he said:
Any person of experienoe in tariff
legislation in the last half-oentury
knows perfeotly well that Oongress oannot re-open single items of tariff without importing disoussion all along the
line • • • without the constant unsettlement of business.
63
Debate over this moot question oontinued in the Senate with
members resorting to oaustio oritioism of the Presifor the stand he was taking on the flexible tariff.
was assailed by Progressives as well as

62 State Paners, I, 104.
63 Ibid., I, 103.

Demoora~,

The
and
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of the regulars.

Most voluble in his condemnation of the

osed measure, as well as of the President's defense of it,
s senator Borah, who requested that the President advise the
te--in fact the whole country--of his attitude toward the inschedules in the bill, the same as he did on the
His comment on the President's statement to the Press
his disapproval of President Hoover's action.

Regarding

t he said:

The President has deemed it proper
to take part in this discussion, to take
a hand in the proceeding. . • • It is not
my idea of the division of the departments
of the Government under the Constitution.
• • • Having undertaken to shape this bill,
the President must go through to the end,
and assume with us the responsibility for
its terms.
64
That they were concerned over the power that the bill would
from Congress and give to the Executive was apparent in the
s of many Senators, including McKellar of Tennessee and La
llette of Wisconsin, as well as Borah.

In a lengthy refutation

f the President's arguments for the measure, Senator McKellar de

• • • We ought not give to the President
this great power of raising revenue. It
is immaterial • • • as it has been admin-

64 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first sesn, 3971.
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LEe

istered heretofore
referred to the
Administration of Harding and Coolid~7
but the great trouble is that it is a
club which we put in the President's
hands for the future • • • toward the
industries, toward the farmers, and toward the consumers.
65
tor LaFollette urged the repeal of the flexible provisions a
. restoration of the Tariff Commission as a bipartisan commission because of the "scandalous record tf of the existing commiesi
in the "exercise of the functions and duties imposed upon it by
flexible provision."

Referring to this record he said:

... LI17 ... is a demand for the repeal of that section of the statute. We
can expect no other result so long as
this tremendous power to raise and lower
duties rests with a commission subservient
to the PreSident, who is not only the Chief
Executive but the titular head of a great
political party. That holds true. "••
regardless of the incumbent in the office. 66
The sharpest criticism came from Senator Borah in one of his
lengthy discourses on the issue:
• • • For a President of the United
States, the leader of his party, holding in his control at the beginning of
his term a patronage which belon~s to
no ruler upon the earth, to declare
that this or that provision should or
should not be voted for in the Senate

65 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first sesion, 3995.
66 Ibid., 35!39.
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or Congress is • . • establishing a
practice and a precedent which we
will in time have cause to regret. 67
defense of the President's action in taking part in sh

ins the tariff law, Senator Reed of Pennsylvania said that Borah'S remarks sounded like a "caustic criticism," • . • nas if
the president were invading our field by issuing that statement
and giving advice," Senator Reed referred to a paragraph of the
Oonstitution describing the duties of the President, which he
said meant very plainly
that it is for the President's judgment
to settle the time and the subject of
his recommendations • • • that he does
recommend to our consideration this provision for a flexible tariff.
68 ~
Senator Fess of Ohio also defended the President when he declared that there was no basis for Senator Borah's claim that, if
the President expressed an opinion on a policy, he had to express
it in detail.

He explained that the President feels concerned

when Congress is dealing with a policy and "has a right to speak.
He continued:

• • • if • • • there is before Congress
an item of tremendous importance and it
is a policy determining item, dealing

67 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first sesSion, 3971.

68

Ibi~.,

3975.
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not with administration, and not with
detail, but with a policy of the Nation
in an effort to mitigate political influence in tariff legislation • • • he
has a right to speak. • •• When it
comes to saying what this item should
be • • • or what this schedule should
be • • • that certainly would not be
expected from the President by anyone
who really recognizes what the President's function ls.
69
As sectional and group conflicts over schedules continued,
the President became even more insistent upon the inclusion of
the flexible clause--he was convinced that the Commission could
oorrect any mistakes and unjust rates in the schedule.

Senators

Reed, Smoot, Edge, and Fess--staunch supporters of the Administ
t10n measure--were urged by President Hoover in White House Conferences to hold out for the flexible clause even though other
major changes might be made in the bill.

70

The advantages to the

oountry of having a Tariff Commission to adjust rates was

empha~

sized by Senator Fess when he told the Senate on September 27:
If the tariff legislation is to
be of any substantial value to the country, it must be carried on with the least
possible political influence that might
prejudice against the facts which have
been selected by a scientific body. I
meant to say that the thinking people of

69 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first sess1on, 4018.

70 Myers, 406, 407.
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the country would like to minimize the
political influence. The Tariff Commission is one agency which we hope will
help to do it, and if a body of experts
directed to collect facts upon which we
can make our decisions can not do it,
then I think it is rather hopeless.
71
Progress of the bill was further impeded, when early in Octo
the "coalition" group defeated the flexible tariff provision
a vote of forty-seven to forty-two.

Still later in the month

the progressives, who were disappointed over the elimination of
the Export Debenture Plan from the Agricultural Marketing Act,

72

8ucceeded in having it included in the Tariff bill.

About this

time some of the regulars began to despair of the bill's passage.
Senator Reed, speaking in Philadelphia, stated that in his opinion the bill was dead, but told the Senate, a few days later, tha
he believed with Senator Smoot of Utah, that it could be passed
if the Senate would confine itself strictly to debate upon the
73
and if reasonable limitation were placed upon debate. When
the Special Session adjourned November 22, 1929, the bill was
Itill under consideration.
In his message to the First Regular Session of the Seventy-

71 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first session, 4015.
72 Myers, 407, 411.
73 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first session, 4958.

fitst Oongress in December, 1929, President Hoover told the members that his views on tariff were unchanged and that 1t would be
.oat helpful "if action should be taken at an early time. n

Again

be emphasized the need for a flexible tariff when he said:
• • • I have been most anxious that the
broad principle of the flexible tariff
as provided in the existing law should
be preserved and its delays in action
avoided by more expeditious methods of
determining the costs of production at
home and abroad, with executive authority
to promulgate such changes upon recommendation of the Tariff Oommission after
exhaustive investigation.
74
The trying situation which had developed in the Senate, where the
regular Republicans, sometimes referred to as "Old Guards" were
in the minority, continued during the regular session and was to
show little change in the months ahead--the forty-two regulars
ing outnumbered by the coalition of fourteen Progressives and
thirty-nine Democrats and one Farmer-Labor vote.

Even some of

the Old Guard Republicaas were showing a reluctance to cooperate
th the Administration program.

The House, while a Republican
75
jority prevailed, continued to be cooperative.
Difficulties over the passage of the bill continued'and the
ertainties resulting from the protracted deliberations over
having a demoralizing effect on the business world
re chaotic conditions resulting from recent collapse of the

74 State Papers, I, 148.
75 Myers, 32.
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.tookmsrket, already existed.

Opposition to the Administration

heightened by the influence of Senator Grundy, recent
to the Senate, who was known to favor protection for into be strongly opposed to the moderate policy of the
president.

Many of the so-called Old Guards joined the Progres-

sives and Democrats further to impede the passage of the bill.
During the deliberations individual Democrats and Progressives,
beoause of special interests, voted more than one thousand times
76
tor increases, or against decreases in tariff duties.
Deeply concerned over the dilatory tactics of the Senate,
the President--on February 24, 1930--conferred with leaders of
the House and Senate and Secretaries Mellon and Mills of the
Treasury, where he again emphasized his views on the tariff bill
77
and urged their support. A bill which included the Export Debenture Plan but omitted the flexible tariff provision was finally
aaed by the Senate on March 24 after about ten months' deliberation.

It was obvious that the frequent exhortations of the

76 Myers, 426.
Merz, 3. .

Con~ressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first sesSion, 4927- 929. Senator Borah blamed the influence of Senator
Grundy for the prolonged session.

77 Myers, 42 5, 426. Senators Watson and McNary, Floor leaders Smoot and Jones of the Senate, Speaker Longworth and Floor
leader Tilson of the House--as well as Congressmen Snell, Wood,
and Hawley--attended this conference at the White House.
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sident had fallen on barren soil.
After further consideration by a conference committee, the
was reported to the House on May 3, where the members again
trated their loyalty to the President by rejecting the "ExDebenture Plan" amendment and the Senate changes in the flex

78

tariff.

When no agreement could be reached by the conferees

President was asked if he had any reason for changing his
1awS on the Export Debenture Plan, to which he replied in a letto Republican floor leader, John

~.

Tilson, that he had not,

further condemned the measure by explaining that an estiTariff Commission placed the cost of the plan to
Treasury, if put into operation, at about $280,000,000 annu-

79

The House refused to give ground on the measure and some acwas mandatory.

The Senate finally yielded and released the

from their promise to stand by the Senate amendments
down the Export Debenture clause and the flexible tarff changes.

The way was thus cleared for final action, and the

78 con~ressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first sesion, 8472- 480, 8496.
The American ~ Book, 1930, 3. The House refused to
the Senate proposal to remove the flexible tariff provis by a vote of 236 to 154.
79 Myers, 43 2 , 433.
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to the conference committee for

~inal

revisions.

The

at this point demanded the inclusion of the flexible
in accordance with his ideas.

This was accomplished

tbrOugh the influence of Representative Hawley and

senat8~

their Republican colleagues in the House and Senate.

Smoot
There

still much dissatisfaction manifest over the industrial sche
ul es and the flexible provisions, but the Senate passed the bill
in conference on June 13 by a vote of forty-four to
The House approved it the following day by a vote of

81

two hundred twenty-two to one hundred fifty-three.

During the

months that the tariff measure had been under considerby Congress, much unfavorable publicity was given to it by
those who opposed it, resulting no doubt in much pressure being
brought to bear on the Congressmen by special interest groups.
There were many who felt that a more satisfactory bill could
have been written and that it could have been handled more expedi
tlously if the President had established his leadership at the
outset and made flat demands for the recognition of his recommen-

80 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, second sesBion, 10133, 10134, 10698, 10846.
The.American Year Book, 1930, 3.
The vote on the flexible tariff was 42-42 making it
cessary for Vice-President Curtis to break the tie. The vote
on the debenture clause was 43 to 41--37 Republican and 6 Democratic votes carried the measure; 12 Republican, 28 Democrat and
1 Farmer-Labor voted "No".
81 IQig., 34. Senators LaFollette and Blaine of Wisconsin
Borah of Idaho were among the Republicans who joined most of
Democrats in the final vote.
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but such a course he seemed unable to pursue--it being
to his concept of the separation of powers in the

gO~Q~~~

__until the exigencies of the situation left him no other
82
He deemed a conciliatory method to be the most effica83
clous in view of the divisions within the party. President Hoor

si~ned

the bill on June 15, 1930.

In a detailed analysis of

statute, he expressed gratification that the campaign pledges
of the Republican party had been fulfilled.

"Platform pledges

not be empty gestures," he said in this regard.

He consid-

the new basis for the operation of the "largely inoperative
provision of the flexible provisions of the 1922 law"
the outstanding accomplishment of the tariff legislation.

By his

insistence he said that:
• • • the means are established for objective and judicial review of • • •
rates upon principles laid down by the
Congress free from pressures inherent
in the legislation. 84
The matter of disrespect and diSObedience for law seemed to
President Hoover to be the most serious of all the problems confronting the nation, and soon after assuming office he took steps
82 See footnote 18, Chapter I.
The American Year Book, 1929, 3.
Lawrence H. Chamberlain, The PreSident, Congress, and
Legislation, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940), 131.
The World Tomorrow, 291.
83 JOBlin, 30, 31.
84 State PaDers, I, 315.
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remedy conditions.

To the need for greater respect for law in

he directed attention in the campaign by promising
law-enforcing commission and again in his inaugural
he referred to it as "the most malign of all the
confronting the countrytl and declared "the worst evil of
sregard for some law is that it destroys respect for all law."
to appoint a national commission for a searching instigation of the whole structure of the Federal system of juri
"to include the method of enforcement of the Eighteenth
and the causes of abuse under it."

Its purpose, he

"will be to make such recommendations for reorganization of
the administration of Federal laws and court procedure as may be
85
und desirable."
Having become, from his engineering practice, a firm beever in the solution of problems by experts--after scientific
thorough investigation--Herbert Hoover came to the Presidency
conviction that the major problems of government likewis
could be solved most effectively by groups of citizens, qualified
and willing to devote time to such study, rather than by a politically dominated and busy Congress.

Thus the early years of his

administration were made notable by the appointment of one important fact-finding commission after another, the most notable be-

85 Merz, 3
State Papers, I, 6.

uu
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86

~ the Wickersham Commission.
This practice was not looked
ino
.i th favor by the Congress who preferred to do its own investiga

ting. and no effort was made to conceal this feeling in the case

of the Law Enforcement Commission.

No work, perhaps, was ever

undertaken with a more sincere desire of accomplishment, but
the time the preliminary report of the Commission
both the purpose and methods of the Commission as well as the i
tentions of the PreSident, were criticized and condemned by the
87
Oongress.
The Comm1ssion--official1y known as the Commission on Law
Enforcement and Observance, but more commonly referred to as the
Wickersham Commission (after the chairman, former Attorney General George W. Wickersham),--was appointed by President Hoover on
88
May 20, 1929. At the initial meeting of the Commission on May

29, the President--after stating that "the American people are
deeply concerned over the alarming disobedience of law," ex-

86 Wilbur and Hyde, 41.
Ogg, 310.
87 Congressional Reoord, Seventy-first Congress, seoond sesBion, 1668, 1731, 2359, 2473, 11812-11814.
88 Wilbur and Hyde, 551.
The members of the Commission besides Mr. Wickersham wer
tormer Seoretary of War, Newton D. Baker; U. S. Cirouit Judge
William S. Kenyon; U. S. Distriot Judges Paul MoCormiok and William GrUbb; former Chief Justioe Kenneth MaoKintosh of the Washington Supreme Court; Dean Rosooe Pound of Harvard; Dootor Ada
Comstook; and Messrs. Henry Anderson, Monte Leman, and Frank
Loesch.
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hope that the Commission would
secure an accurate determination of
fact and cause, following them with
constructive, courageous conclusions
which would bring public understanding and command public support of its
solutions.
89
The preliminary report including certain conclusions drawn
bY the members was submitted in writing to President Hoover by
the chairman on November 21, 1929, and reported in the Senate
January 13, 1930. Thereafter it was discussed in both the House
90
and the Senate. An article written by Howard Lee McBain for the

lew

~ork

World and printed in the Record at the request of Sena-

tor Walsh, analyzed and condemned the report, labeling it "one of
the most extraordinary public documents that has ever emanated
from a nonpartisan agency of inquiry" and stating that the decla
ations, "disclosed a perfectly amazing amount of ignorance of, or
indifference to, both the law and the actual practice of district
91
attorneys under the law." Two of the four specific recommendations that called forth criticism in the form of sarcasm and ridioule were the proposals that enforcement be moved out of Treas
89 State Papers, I, 63.
90 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, second sesSion:, 1502, 1504. The report stated that it had given "careful
consideration, among other things, to the question of tha observance and enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment and the National Prohibition Actl1 • • . and that "before embarking on public
hearings" it had made a careful study of the whole question, securing information from responsible officers of government,
printed reports, and from hearings before Congressional committee.
91 IQ!g., 2359, 2360. Howard Lee. McBain was a Ruggles Professor of Constitutional Law at Columbia University at the time.

Department to the Department of Justioe, and one that stated,
"_e think it is possible to provide a hearing in the United
states Distriot Court before a magistrate provided trial by jury
in that oourt LState Court? 1s preserved to the aooused."

They

considered it feasible to make use of the existing system of
united states Oommissioners.

92

Certain statements in the report

regarding legal prooedures were branded as utterly false in the
McBain artiole.

Members were oharged with attempting to do away

with the safeguards to the preservation of trial by jury by Representatives Blaok and Oliver, respeot1vely:
• • • the mountains labored and all
they bave brought forth is a mess, a
ridioulous legal mess. • •
• • • the President's • • • Commission
met, meditated, and mimeographed. •• 93
The Commission was oharged with expending large sums of
money for investigation of matters other than the violation and
enforoement of the prohibition law.

Senator Glass, author of

the provision for the defioienoy appropriation of #250,000 made
January 18, 1930, for the stated purpose of "investigating the
problem of enforoing prohibition" deolared that "the only question of law enforoement before the oountry was 'fenforoement of

92 Congressional Reoord, Seventy-first Congress, seoond sesSion, 1504, 1505.
93 Ibid., 1668.
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the

Eight~4nth

_i tb it."

Amendment and the statutes enaoted in aooordanoe

This, of oourse, was not what the President had in

.ind, nor the meaning he meant to oonvey in any of his statement
or utteranoes where he stressed "the need for investigation into
the oause and remedy for orime in general and the determination
of the reform needed in our judicial and administrative machinery."

95

An appropriation of $100,000, requested by President Hoo-

ver, to oarry out the work of the Oommission was cut out of the
appropriation bills by the Senate on June 27, 1930.

ThiS, no

doubt, disappointed the PreSident, but it did not deter him from
authorizing a oontinuation of the Oommission's work.

In a publi

statement he said that he would be able to seoure from private
souroes the #100,000 needed to complete the work undertaken by
the Oommission.

96

The final report of the Commission was submitted January 20,

1931,

Unfavorable comments and publioity that preceded its ap-

pearanoe ooupled with the rapidly aooumulating problems resulting
from the business depression both here and abroad tended to lessen appreciation of the oarefully prepared findings on this very

94 Oongressional Reoord, Seventy-first Oongress, seoond session, 1911, 11814.
This amount was out out of the bill by the House beoause
the Senator had limited its use to investigation of the prohibition aot.
95 State Papers, I, 344.
96 Myers, 445.
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important national problem.

The group as a whole voted against

outright repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment, the restoration in
any form of the legalized saloon, the federal or state governments entering into the liquor business, or any modification of
the volstead Act.

Conflicting views of individual members, fil

in separate reports, showed that two favored repeal, six favored
modification, and four were willing to see the experiment cont
ued.

In the opinion of a recognized authority in the field of

history, Lewis M. Hacker, in the accumulation of evidence agains
national prohibition, the report "oonstituted one of the most
97
illuminating publio doouments of modern times." Faots gathered
olearly indioated that prohibition had broken down and that the
ourrent organization for enforoement was inadequate.

All membe

a.greed that, if the Amendment was revised, "the regulation and
prohibition of the manufaoture, traffio, transportation and ex98
portation of liquor should be a power resting with Congress."
Before the Speoial Session had adjourned, the nation was
facing an unexpeoted turn of

~vents

with the collapse of the

stock market in the middle of Ootober, 1929.

The first shock on

October 23 was followed by more serious crashes and partial reooveries on October 26 and 29.

~

While the people generally did

97 Louis M. Haoker, "The Rise and Fall of PrOhibition",
History, 36:671, September, 1932.
98 Myers, 467, 468.
Haoker, 671.
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rea11ze the seriousness of the situation until months later,
it was reflected in a few weeks in a fall in prices of agricultur

commodities and in a slight decrease in employment.

The orgy

stock speculation that was sweeping the country at the time of
inauguration gave the President cause for concern early in
s administration over the financial stability of the country.

99

When speculation with borrowed money began to reach an alltime high and legitimate business was unable to obtain needed
loans from banks, the President conferred with the Federal Res
and Secretary of the Treasury Mellon.

Efforts were made to

discourage the ever-increasing wave of stock speculation by restricting credit to banks loaning money for speculation.

Warni

of Secretary Mellon and the Federal Reserve Board went undeeded
and the inevitable climax came when owners of large blocks of
100
stock began selling out their enormous holdings.
Realizing the seriousness of the situation but not revealing
his deep concern over the effect this crisis might have on business and industry and upon the social and economic status of the
people, the President laid plans to forestall an increase in unemployment and a lowering of wages.

On November 15 he began to

summon leaders of industry, business and labor to conferences at

99 Myers, 17.
See Appendix D, for summary of causes of the stock market
Collapse.
100 Myers, 14-16.
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tb e White House to secure their cooperation in preventing unemand hardship.

It was his idea that the best

~esults

_oul d be obtained through the individual efforts of the people,
_1s el y guided and stimulated by competent leadership.

He planned

to expand public works and construction to provide work for those
_bo might be in need--an idea carried over from his work as
101

man of the Unemployment Conference in 1922.
A conference with nearby railroad presidents on November 19
to discuss maintenance of normal construction work was followed
by meetings with leaders of the major industries and outstanding
labor leaders on November 21.

The means recommended to the in-

dustrialists included maintaining planned construction for the
present and the distribution of available work among all employee
--by a shortening of the work week, if necessary.

Each industry

was encouraged to look after the distress of its own employees.
In every instance the leaders expressed willingness to cooperate
with the program.

The President announced in a Press statement

after the first conference that the railway executives were unanimous in their decision to maintain business progress and employment.

The industrial leaders, too, expressed approval of the p

of organization, subject to the agreement of the leaders of labor
This was secured in the afternoon meeting with labor leaders,

101 Myers, 24, 25.
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included the Secretary of Labor, James J. Davis and Willi
102

~hich

The results of these conferences were highly gratifying.
the success of the President in securing their cooperation was
revealed in statements made public after the meetings.

The em-

ployers authorized the President to announce for them that they
would not initiate any movement

~or

wage reduction, a policy

which they recommended for the whole country.

The representa-

tives of labor authorized him to state for them that they believed and recommended that "no movement beyond those already in
negotiation should be initiated for increases in wages" and that
103
labor should cooperate with industry in solving its problems.
Conferences followed with leaders of building and construction
industries, national agricultural organizations and public utilities.

Governors and mayors throughout the country were also

asked to cooperate in providing employment by expansion of public
works.
On December 12, 192 9, the first regular session of the Sev
ty-first Congress convened.

As stated earlier in this chapter,

the Senate remained unfriendly to the recommendations of the
President.

Consequently the President had to go out of his way

to secure the cooperation of enough members to secure passage of

102 State Papers, I, 134.
103 Ibid., 136, 137.
This accomplishment bears out the statement made in
ter I
7

needed legislation.

While the House retained a Republican maj

ity, their loyalty and cooperation could usually be counted on to
break down the obstruction policies practiced by the Senate.

In

biB first annual message to Congress on December 3, he reviewed
tbe economic situation in the country and expressed confidence
tbat normal conditions would be restored if the means adopted
were carried out:

·..................
The country has enjoyed a large degree of prosperity and sound progress
during the past year with a steady improvement in methods of production and
distribution and consequent advancement
in 'standards of living. • • •
Fortunately, the Federal Reserve
System had taken measures to strenghthen
the position against the day when speculation would break, which together with
the strong position of the banks has carried the whole credit system through the
crisis without impairment • • • •
The sudden threat of unemployment
and especially the recollection of the
economic consequences of previous crashes under a much less secured financial
system created unwarranted pessimism and
fear. • • •
I have, therefore, instituted systematic, voluntary measures of cooperation with the business institutions and
with state and municipal authorities to
make certain that fundamental businesses
of the country shall continue as usual ••
We have canvassed the Federal Government and instituted measures of nrudent
expansion in such work that should be
helpful, and upon which the different departments will make some early recommendations to Congress.
I am convinced that through these
measures we have reestablished confidence. Wages should remain stable. A
very large degree of industrial unemploy-
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ment and suffering which would otherwise
have occurred has been nrevented. Agricultural prices have reflected the returning confidence. The measures taken
must be vigorously pursued until normal
conditions are restored.
104
Early in January Congress was asked to authorize increases
1n appropriations for the Public Building program, Rivers and

Harbors, Public Roads and the Colorado River Dam, ceilings on
the amounts to be apprepriated for each project being indicated
by President Hoover.

The budget presented to Congress on Decem-

ber 4, 1929, for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1930, showed
that the appropriations for these items as well as for the revolving fund administered by the Farm Board could be made without
a noticeable increase in expenditures, if recommended reductions
105
were made in other directions.
By the middle of February there were indications that the
danger of a general panic had been averted.

Reports submitted to

the President showed that stock-brokers' loans of eight and a
half billion dollars had been liquidated to three billion with
aid of the Federal Reserve System--the apprehension among
tors had abated; the index of all employment, prepared by the Department of Labor, showed the drop from 93.3 in October to 86.0

104 State Papers, I, 145, 146.
105 Myers, 34, 35.
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1n Deoember had inoreased to 92.8, and reports from governors in
thirty-six states showed that no unusual amount of distress had
106
resulted from unemployment.
Meanwhile a temporary organization of business and labor
leaders had been formed at a oonferenoe with President Hoover on
Deoember 5, 1929.

In an address to several hundred representa-

tives, the President emphasized the responsibility of business
and the need for their oooperation in maintaining eoonomio stability.

He gave the whole oountry some good advioe when he told

them:

......... ... ...... .
Beyond this; a great responsibility for stability and prosperity rests
with the whole people. I have no desire to preach. I may, however, mention one good word--work.
107
Statistios oompiled from a house-to-house oanvas of employed and
unemployed, undertaken at the request of the President, showed
that the number of unemployed in April, 1929, was apparently
1,900,000, and that 1,200,000 had been out of employment for les
108
than a month.
By the end of May, reports from eoonomists and oommeroial
and industrial authorities, inoluding Charles M. Sohwab of the

106 Myers, 35.
107 State Papers, I, 184.
108 Myers, 37.
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Bethlehem Steel Corporation, indicated that there was good reas
to feel that the I1recession in prosperity had run its oourse. 1t
The President meantime had been critioized by members of Congress
for his optimism about the future.

Secretary of·Labor Davis re-

marked at the time that conditions would have been worse without
109
the efforts of the President.
It was true that, from the sv_".~--.
point of previous experience in relief work, the country had
er had a leader any better qualified to take the initiative in
determining policies that would most effectively combat the ex110
lsting orisis.
Meanwhile the measures designed to provide relief were
oonsideration by Congress.

There being little disagreement

members of either House or Senate as to the need for relief,
problem was to hold appropriations down to the levels recommena.e(l.l
by

the President, who was opposed to any unnecessary expenditure

at this time.

Controversy centered on three bills introduced by

Senator Wagner, the junior senator from New York, dealing with
relief measures and calling for appropriations far in excess of
III
the amounts stipulated as being adequate.
These billS, designated S. 3059, S. 3060, and S. 3061 in

109 Myers, 37.
110 See footnote 2 in Chapter I and Appendix A.
III Congressional Record, Sev.enty-first Congress, second se
aion, 7702, 7803.
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order named, embodied three principles--first, to provide for
advance planning and regular construction of public works for
stabilization of industry and for the prevention of unemployment
during periods of depression; second, to provide for the establishment of a national employment system and for cooperation of
the states in promoting such a system; and for that purpose, the
oreation of a bureau in the Department of Labor to be known as
the United States Employment Service; third, to amend the Depart
ment of Labor Act of 1913 so as to provide unemployment statistics covering all branches of trade and industry.

One bill car-

ried with it an appropriation of $4,000,000 to be used for conducting surveys, the others on unemployment and long-range plan1
ning for public works involved an expenditure up to $150,000,000
With very little opposition, the Senate passed all three meas113
ures.
The President considered these appropriations unnecessary
additions to the budget and voiced his objection to the passage
of the bills in a letter to Representative Wood, Chairman of the
114
House Appropriations Committee, on April 18.
With minor chan~e
the bill S. 3061, for advance planning on unemployment, was
passed by the House on July 2 and went to the President for his

112 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, second
session, 9399.
113 Ibid., 7803, 8749.
114 Myers, 35.
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115
signature.
gou se •

The bill S. 3509 provoked'more disoussion in the

Amendments added there substantially ohanged the bill

and upon its return to the Senate, that body, on the motion of
senator Wagner, disagreed to the amendments and oalled for a 0
116
terenoe. This was on July 1.
The House on July 2, on the moti

ot Representative Graham, insisted on the House amendments and
the Senate Conferenoe.

In oondemnation of the House efforts to

modify the bill in oonformity with the Administration views,
Representative Celler 'of New York questioned the sinoerity of
the President's stand when he said:
• • • There is a disposition to minimize the present unemployment and business depression. Proolamation after
proolamation is promulgated by the President that prosperity is in the offing
and with eaoh proolamation unemployment
and business adversity inoreases. The
Administration must sooner or later faoe
the truth. Why not now? • . •
It is rather anomalous that the
title of the bill reads: "To provide for
the advanoe planning and regulated oonstruotion, eto." yet the vital parts of
the bill providing the advanoe planning
are strioken from the bill.
117
As far as oould be asoertained, the bill S. 3060, providing
for the national employment system--the very prinoiple of whioh

115 Con~ressional Reoord, Seventy-first Congress, seoond
session, 122 2, 12283, 12320.
116 Ibid., 7803, 8742, 12267, 12370.
117 Congressional Reoord, Seventy-first Congress, seoond
session, 12271.
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_as contrary to the President's professed concept of the funcof the Government--was reported with amendments to the
118
but was not acted upon.
Opposition to this measure,
Senator Bingham, was based on the fact that it was a
,ederal Aid proposition.

His views appeared to substantiate the

sentiment of the President.

These were:

• • • I am one of those who believe in
representative government. I believe
that government by the people depends
for its sanity, its health, its safety,
upon a strong measure of local selfgovernment.
119
Congress adjourned on July 3, 1930, having passed the bills
providing appropriations for public works in substantially the
same amounts as requested by the President.

These were, Rivers

and Harbors, $145,000,000; Public Buildings, #530,000,000; Public Roads subsidies to the states $75,000,000, and #165,000,000
.
120
for the Colorado River Dam and its subsidiaries.
These appropriations being passed, work could be started on the dam on the
Colorado River and other public works.
Demands on government revenues were exceeding expectations
and the President, early in July, urged greater economy in government bureaus and departments so as to equalize the increases
necessary for relief expenditures.

Conditions were further ag-

118 Congressional Rec~, Seventy-first Congress, second ses
Sian, 11238, 11239, 11876:
119 Ibid., 8742.
120

40.
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gravated in late summer when the threat of a drought in some of
tbe farming states gave rise to the need for more extensive relief measures.

The states affeoted were in the Potomao, Ohio,

and lower Mississippi river valleys, where about one million people and twenty million animals were affeoted.
tbe President with the

governo~s

A oonferenoe of

of these states led to the

1zation of the National Drought Commission under the ohairmanship
of seoretary of Agrioulture Hyde, for the ooordination of state
121

and Federal aotivities to relieve drought sufferers.
In Ootober the President announoed plans for the organizat10n of a nation-wide program of measures to relieve distress
during the winter of 1930-31.

At this time he expressed a wholly

new oonoept of national duty when he deolared that the nation had
an obligation to prevent hunger and oold to those people who were
122

really in need.

Prinoiples to be followed were outlined by the

President, who was opposed to any plan that would oall for direot
relief from the Government.

The plan expressed the oonoept of

the President regarding the role of the Government in relief work
It provided:
• • • That the whole must be deoen-

121 Myers, 42, 43.
122 Wilbur and Hyde, 361.
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tralized; that no central administration could competently direct such
widespread activities; that no paid
bureaucracy could be trained during
an emergency; that voluntary service
of the leading.citizens of every community on a non-political basis must
be secured for administration; that
these decentralized agencies must be
given full authority with sufficient
checks to see that the work was effectively done.
123
The organization known as "The President's Committee for
unemployment" was formed on October 30, 1930, under the chairmanship of Colonel Arthur Woods.

Through the cooperation of thi

group with governors and state unemployment authorities, statew1de non-partisan relief committees were set up and efforts were
made to coordinate private activities with local and federal ser
124
v1ces.
The appointment of the commission was looked upon by
some as an admission that the unemployment problem had not been
adequately met.
In the light of happenings in the months that followed the
inauguration, the PreSident's prediction of prosperity for the
country expressed on that occasion appears to have been illtimed, yet the succession of events that led to the economic contusion in later months could hardly have been foretold at that
time.

123 Myers, 123.
124 Ibid., 53.

CHAPTER III
MID-TERM RELATIONSHIPS, 1930-1931
From the beginning of the depression President Hoover held
the Federal government had an obligation to alleviate the
of the depression and to facilitate recovery.

This con-

national duty was reiterated by the President in October,
1930, when he stated: "As a nation we must prevent hunger and
1

cold to those of our people who are in honest difficulties."
had a conviction about the best way to mitigate
suffering.

This was to organize the individual efforts of

people in the community by offering stimulation and leadership so that governmental aid could be extended that would not
2

infringe on individual liberty.

To this end, at the outset of

the depression, he held conferences with leaders of industry to
determine ways and means of maintaining wages and of preventing
strikes.

3

In organizing relief measures Hoover insisted that certain
principles be observed in order to administer relief work effectively in every community and to avoid politics, waste, and corruption.

Summarily these included a decentralized administra-

1 Wilbur and Hyde, 361.
State Papers, I, 402.
2 The American Year Book, 193 2 , 17.

3 See Chapter II, pages 55 and 56.
Myers, 34.
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on, the securing of voluntary service of leading citizens on a
~political

basis--he did not believe that a paid bureaucracy

~oould be trained and organized in a depression--and that the de-

'oentralized agencies be given ample authority under careful 4upervision to see that the work was successfully carried out.

1y when voluntary action failed was governmental action to be
5
As the year 1930 advanced, the business depression and unemployment had been further aggravated by an unprecedented
drought affecting wide-spread areas in twenty-one states result6
ing in crop failures and family destitution. Partisan groups and
agitators placed the number of destitute families at five
but more conservative estimates made in October,1930, and
on the application of the Department of Labor
taken in April of that year placed the number of unemployed at
four and a half million and the number of families without a
earner at one and a half million.

It was expected that this

ber would increase to two million in the winter ahead.
4
5
6
7

7

Myers, 53.
Wilbur, 47.
Myers, 58 •.
state Papers, I, 431.
Myers, 52: Of the four and one-half million, about one a
one-half million were normally employed but at the time were in
the process of shifting from one job to another. Another 500,
were considered unemployables. Of the remaining two and one-ha
million, out of employment because of the depression, there were
1.7 wage earners per family. This would leave 1,500,000 familie
without any wage earner--or in the destitute class.
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1dent warned against exaggeration in the unemployment situation.
From the beginning of his administration President Hoover
18.o ked a real majority support of the Senate.

A nominally Repub

lio an Senate--oontaining an insurgent group from the West, who
formed a ooalition with the Demooratio members--oreated a
strained relationship, whioh was offset only by the effeotive
leadership of Speaker Nioholas Longworth in the House of Representatives, where the Republioans held a plurality of one hun8
dred members. The Congressional eleotions in November, 1930,
gave the Demoorats a deoided viotory in the House of Representatives and inoreased the number in the Senate from forty-two to
9
forty-eight. Although seating of the new members would not take
plaoe until the first session of the Seventy-seoond Congress in
Deoember, 1931, this swing toward the opposition party had its
effeot on the relations of :Bresident Hoover to Congress during
the year 1931 and, oonsequently, on their disposal of the Administration's legislative program.

Their viotory gave the Demo-

orats an opportunity to olaim that the Hoover leadership had be
8 The Amerioan Year Book, 1931, 6.
The Third Session of the Seventy-first Oongress was made
up as follows: in the Senate there were fifty-three Republioans,
forty-two Demoorats, and one Farmer-labor member; in the House
there were two hundred sixty-six Republioans, one hundred sixtyfive Demoorats, one Farmer-labor and three vaoanoies.
9 .!!2.1£., 6.
The general eleotion of 1930 resulted in the return of
hundred eighteen Republicans, two hundred sixteen Demoorats and
one Farmer-labor member to the House; and of forty-eight Republioans, forty-seven Demoorats and one Farmer-labor member to the
Senate.
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repudia ted.
However, on November 7, a few days after the election, p
in ent Democratic leaders pledged their support to recovery
lation and to ?ooperation with the Administrative measures in
next Congress.

This pledge was the combined expression of seven

national leaders who asserted that the recent victory afforded
the Democratic party an opportunity to do constructive work and
to that end it intended to cooperate with the Republicans and

1

other factions "without regard to selfish political advantage."
ThiS statement, while having an antidotal effect on the tension,
should not be considered an indication of total predisposition
on the part of the Democrats to accept all administrative propos
also

On November 13 the right of these Democratic leaders to

make any promises on behalf of the party was challenged by Senator Carter Glass.

His statement quoted in The New York Times

said:
• • • he ffienator Glass? questioned the
authority of "any undelegated group of
gentlemen" to pledge two hundred sixtyfour Democrats in Congress Dorty-seven
Senators and two hundred seventeen Representative!? "to a precipitately devised
course of action."
11
10 The New York Times, November 8, 1930.
The seven national leaders were "James M. Cox, John W.
DaVis, Alfred E. Smith, the Presidential nominees in the last te
years; Joseph T. Robinson, party leader in the Senate; John N.
Garner, House leader; John J. Raskob, Chairman of the National
Committee; and Jonett Shouse, head of the Executive Commission."
11 The New York Times,November 13, 1930.
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In a public acknowledgment of this promise, the President
alsO inquired whether they meant cooperation in passing needed
legi8~ation

for relief to agriculture and unemployment during the

forthcoming session.

An assurance from Congressman Garner that

politiCS would be a secondary oonsideration in the organization
of the House led the President, early in Deoember, to make a
statement to the Press that the leaders of both parties were co12
operating on the passage of relief measures.
Looking to an early vote on the much-needed relief measures
1n

the coming session of Congress, the President, in Nove.mber,

set up what he deemed an adequate program of legislation, one
which he hoped would meet the approval of leaders in both parties.

Of the prospects for the passage of this measure an arti-

cle in The New York Times commented;
If the Republican and Democratic
leaders can forget their party lines
during the three months of the final
session of the present Congress, there
is every reason for the belief that
the relief program of the Administration can be written into law and all
appropriation bills for the running
of the government be enacted..
13
Some opposition was anticipated from the Republican insurgents
led by Senators Norris, Borah, LaFollette, and Brookhart, and

12 Myers, 59.
Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, third ses-

Sion, 407.

13 The New York Times, November 13, 1930.
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the Demooratio insurgent Senators Wheeler, Dill, and Walsh.
In his seoond annual message to Congress on Deoember 2, 1930
the open.ing of the third session of the Seventy-first Congress
president Hoover reviewed the economic situation in the country
and expressed gratification over the accomplishments already made
through organization in the states and munioipalities:
During the past twelve months we
have suffered with other nations from
economic depression.

............ .......

In the larger view the major
forces of the denression now lie outside of the United states • • • our
reouperation has been· retarded by the
unwarranted degree of fear and apprehension created by these outside
forces • • •
Economic depression cannot be
cured by legislative action or executive pronouncement. Eoonomic wounds
must be healed by • • • the producers
and the oonsumers themselves. Reoovery
can be expedited and its efforts mitigated by cooperative action. • •
Our people are responding to these
impulses in remarkable degree.
The best contribution of government
lies in encouragement of the voluntary
cooperation in the oommunity • • •

......... . . ........

The Federal Government is engaged upon
the greatest program • • • of improvement in all our history • • •
To meet the exigencies of the coming year he recommended a continuation of the same policies:
I favor still further temporary expansion of these activities in aid to
unemnloyment during this winter.
14 The New York Times, November 13, 1930.
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·................
There are certain common-sense limitations upon any expansion of construction work. The Government must not undertake works that are not of sound economic purpose and that have not been subject to searching technical investigation, and which have not been given adequate consideration by Congress.

·................

I feel warranted in asking the Congress
for an appropriation of from $100,000,000
to #150,000,000 to provide further employment in this emergency • • • I recommend that this appropriation be made distributable to the different departments
upon recommendation of a committee of the
Cabinet and approved by the President.
• • Such action will imply an expenditure
of all kinds of over #650,000,000 during
the next twelve months.
15
Acting upon the President's recommendations, the House ApMn~~~'ations

Committee, early in December, reported bills provid-

appropriations of #30,000,000 for drought relief and of #110,
1

,000 for an emergency fund to accelerate public construction.
15
16

State Paners, I, 428-430.
Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, third ses

sion, 807.
The New York Times, December 10, 1930. This figure was
#40,000,000 less than the maximum amount suggested by President
Hoover.
The emergency fund bill provided that the appropriation
of #110,000,000 be distributed $80,000,000 to the Department of
Agriculture for apportionment to the states as a temporary advance to meet the provisions for Federal-aid highway projects;
#25,500,000 to the War Department for flood control and rivers
and harbors work; #3,000,000 to the Department of Agriculture
construction and maintenance of roads and trails in the national
forests, and #1,500,000 to the Interior for improvements in na~
tional parks. It also made the funds available to Sept. 1 in~
stead of June 30, the end of the fiscal year.
The drought relief bill provided that the Secretary of
Agriculture make the loans for the purchase of land, seed for
suitable crops, fertilizers, feed, and other purposes prescribed

77
Both branches of the government took action on these measures on
December ninth.

The emergency fund bill was passed exactly as

reported by the House oommittee, but the Senate demanded a larger
appropriation for the drought sufferers.

Voting without roll

call, they authorized a $60,000,000 farm loan fund, favored by
the Senate Agrioulture Committee, overriding the olaims of the
17
Administration that #30,000,000 was suf£ioient. Republioan flo
leader Senator Watson, desirous of oooperating with the Presiden
in keeping appropriations within a limit that would avert higher
taxes, expressed

~isapproval

of the reoommendations of the Senate

Agrioulture Committee; but Senator Borah, on the other hand,
mented that he had been observing the trend toward larger

0

expaI"~-.

18

itures and he did not see how new taxes oould be avoided.
Seoretary of Agrioulture Hyde and President Hoover were
quiok to condemn the Senate action, the former asserting that
the appropriation of publio loans for the purohase of human food
would set an unusual preoedent and that it dangerously resembled
19
the dole system. In defense of the proposal Senator Robinson
oalled that Congress had appropriated $20,000,000 for the relief
of starving Russians in 1921.
~

His oomment, quoted in The New

Times, oarried a note of sarcasm:

17 Congressional Reoord, Seventy-first Congress, third session, 807-809.
18 The New York Times, Deoember 7, 1930.
19 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, third session, 405-409.
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It is right to give food for other
nations, but by some mysterious and in_
explicable reasoning it is wrong to give
it to our own citizens.
20
The President, apparently resentful over the radical changes
~ade

by the Senate in his proposed relief measures, condemned

their action in a statement to the Press which clearly indicated
his

displeasure-~and

to criticism.

at the same time revealed his vulnerability

Since the stand taken by the President brought

stinging rebukes from the Senate and accusations that he was
wholly without appreciation of or sympathy for the needs of the
unemployed and the drought sufferers, his statement on this occasion should be noted here:
The gross sums which I have recommended to carryon the essential functions of the Government include the extreme sums which can be applied by the
Federal Government in·actual emergency
or relief, and are the maximum which can
be financed without increase in taxes·.•

..

Prosperity cannot be restored by
raids upon the public treasury • • •
The leaders of both par,ties are cooperating to prevent any such event •••
Some
these schemeil represent •
• • the desire of individuals to show
that they are more generous than the Administration or that they are more generous than even the leaders of their own
parties. They are playing politics at
the expense of human misery.
21

LOf

20 The New York Times, December 10, 1930.
21 State Paners, I, 459.
Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, third sesSion, 407.
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When read to the Senate by Senator Caraway of Arkansas, the
statement precipitated an avalanche of criticism culminating
in bitter and unwarranted attacks upon the President, which gave
the President most unfavorable publicity in the Press.

An examp

f the type of criticism to which the President was sUbjected is

dent in Senator Caraway's remarks:
The reputation, whatever he has •
• • of the President of the United
States rests upon administering a relief fund which never cost him a cent.
It rests upon extending relief to destitute humanity • • • yet, without having done anything or having made one
recommendation that would at all relieve
the conditions, • • • the President now
lectures the Congress of the United
States and those organized agencies for
relief outside of Congress who are unwilling to sit down and see human beings
starve because of maladministration and
overwhelming misfortune caused by natural agencies.
22
Both Senators Caraway and Walsh questioned the meaning of
sident's statement that the leaders of Congress are cooperati
any such event."

"As to what is included in the dec-

ration," 'said Caraway, "everyone will have to answer for himAdditional comments of Senator Walsh of Massachusetts atthe President's prestige:
Why are we who dare to propose
something additional to what he has
proposed charged with playing politics?
• • • the President can continue to assert and insinuate that those who Pni>'-

22 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, third sesSion, 407. See footnote 37, Chapter I.
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pose remedial measures here are
"playing politics," but I propose
to leave nothing undone to force
public attention upon the need more
than ever of constructive efforts
and of expenditures of money--all
that may be needed; all and more
than Russia's hungry people had in
1919.
23
The most caustic remarks--queted to the public by The New
~~ Times the following day--were made by Senator McKellar, who

condemned the President for giving his message to the newspapers
instead of sending it to Congress, and by Senator Blaine, who
spoke of President Hoover as the "mediocre politician now occupying the Executive chair" and as one "overtouted as a great
24
eer." During the filibuster thus started, and which continued
for a week, with the Senate members denying the charge of "playing politics" and countering with insinuations against the President, Senator Robinson of Arkansas, Democratic floor leader
stated his disapproval of the President's remarks when he said:
The President apparently lost
his temper when he issued his statement yesterday • • • his statement,
of course, is to be dondemned. I do
not propose to follow the bad example
that has been set • • •
But, by his challenge to his party followers for cooperation, he
redeemed himself with these words:
My purpose is to try to do my

23 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, third session, 408.
24
New York Times, December 11, 1930. See footnote 37,
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duty to my party, my people, and most
of all, to my oountry • • • I should
like to see this Congress now aot in
a spirit of greater oooperation.
25
Most of those who urged inoreased appropriations were aoti~ated

by letters and telegrams from their oonstituents, espeoial-

ly in the areas affeoted by the drought, urging and pleading for
help from the Federal Government in the form of loans to looal
banks, and for food and feed.

Many of these letters and tele-

grams were printed in the Congressional Reoords at the request of

26

senators reoeiving them.
A oompromise agreement was finally reaohed by both Houses,
just before the Christmas reoess on Deoember 20, setting the appropriation at $45,000,000 for drought relief.

27

The President's relations with the Senate, never harmonious,
grew even more strained in the suooeeding weeks of the third sess~on,

and further impeded the progress of the Administration's

legislative program.

At this point it is evident that undue sen-

sitivity to oritioism--always a regrettable luxury--was indeed
the AOhille's heel whioh demoralized the oooperative relationship
between President Hoover and his Congress.
25 Congressional Reoord, Seventy-first Congress, third sesBion, 409.
26 Ibid., 789-792.
The drought-strioken areas were distributed through the
Btates of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, North and South Carolina,
Virginia, Ohio, Oklahoma, Indiana, Illinois, Minnesota, North Dakota, Montana, New Mexioo, and Missouri.

27 Congressional Reoord, Seventy-first Congress, third session, 1167.
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Congress reconvened on January 5, 1931, faced with highly
oontroversial issues--including further remedies for unemployment
drOUght relief, and financial assistance to the veterans of the
ld War I--all of which issues were made more acute by the deOn all issues except the soldiers' bonus the encounter
between the President and the Republican House leaders on the
side, and the Democratic leaders and the Republican insur28
gents on the other.
A survey of the accomplishments made under the organized
drive for increased construction by the Federal, state, and local
governments to relieve unemployment showed that stimulated construction by public utilities and governments had increased #1,
130,000,000 in 1930 over the amount spent in 1929, while private
construction had decreased $1,420,000,000 in the same period.

It

sthus estimated that, through the relief plan, employment had
provided for at least a million families who otherwise would
29
had no income. A re-survey of the progress of the UnemployRelief ASSOCiation, under the chairmanship of Colonel Woods,
reported on December 31 that distress would be well cared for dur
winter.

Despite these reports, it was stated by sources

the Government that, while private charity and welfare

28 Myers, 60-61.
29

~.,

60.
This report was submitted to the President by the Denartof Commerce on December 31, 1930.
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organizations--supplemented by appropriations from municipalities--were doing their best to relieve distress, the burden was
beooming weighty.

Relief workers admitted that more drastic ac30 "
tion would soon be necessary.
Care of the drought sufferers had been in the hands of the

Amerioan Red Cross since August, 1930.

Plans for a public appea

in January to raise an additional $lO,OOO,OOO--bringing their to
ta.l resources to #20,000,000--had been agreed to by President
31
Hoover and Judge Payne, Chairman of the Red Cross. Before this
drive got under way a proposal, sponsored by Senators Robinson,
Borah, and others, was placed before the Senate to increase the
#45,000,000 drought fund by #25,000,000 for human relief, by di32
reot distribution of the Federal Government. This brought an
immediate protest from Judge Payne, who expressed a great unwillingness to have the money appropriated, insisting that the Red
Oross could take care of human needs, if the Government would
33
provide a loan for seed and feed.
Since the President of the United States is President of the

30 Francis Brown, "The Unemployment Crisis," Current His36: 414, July, 1932. In the succeeding pages this article
will be referred to as Brown, Current History.

~,

31 Myers, 60-62.
32 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, third sesBion, 3369-3372.
33 Ibid., 3371, 3372.
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~ed

Cross, it was suspeoted that this deoision was made in defer-

enoe to the President's philosophy that the Government should not
infringe on individual liberty by offering direot finanoial assistanoe to those in need.

The oontroversy, onoe begun, oonti

for weeks with members of the Senate again attaoking the President's relief taotios, and the President remaining adamant in his
oonviotions.

The sentiment of the Senators was indioated in the

speeoh of Senator MoKellar of Tennessee:
I am'willing to join the other Senators and stop all other legislation until the neoessary appropriations are
passed by Congress and signed by the President, or if he refuses to sign, until
they are passed over his veto.
34
Aoousations were made that the Red Cross had beoome the
soreen behind whioh the President of the United States was undertaking to shirk his responsibilities to see that those who are in
need are relieved.

It seemed inoredible, aooording to Senator

Copeland of New York, that an organization "founded to give relief and to administer to distressed human beings should even intimate that it would refuse money appropriated by Congress for
that purpose."

Furthermore, he declared that it was diffioult to

understand how a man who had done so muoh to relieve starvation
in other lands oould be so obstinate about relief for Amerioan

34 Congressional Reoord, Seventy-first Congress, third session, 3373.
I
I
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35
oitizens.
A resolution appropriating the #25,000,000 passed on J

20 by the Senate was rejected on January 29 by the House Appropriations Committee after Chairman Payne had declared to that
oommittee that the additional funds were unnecessary.

36

This ac-

tion aroused the ire of Senator Borah, who replied that the appropriation was not a dole but entirely in accord with governmental policy.
speech

ll

In what The New York Times termed an "impassi

he maintained that the Red Cross was not meeting the sit

uation and that the American people had never hesitated to take
money from the treasury of the United States "to care for those
who are afflicted."

37

His determination to carry through the Sen-

ate program was apparent in his remarks:
I am perfectly willing to say
that not another appropriation bill
shall pass this body until the hungry
are fed, until the sick are taken care
of, until the Government of the United
States has met its obligation to its
distressed and hungry citizens.
38
Impelled, perhaps, by the urgency for cooperation, the President, in a more conciliatory mood, replied to the charges of the

35 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, third sesSion, 3374, 3375. See footnote 37, Chapter I.
36 Myers, 61-62.
37 The New York Times, February 3, 1931.
38 Congressional Recor~J Seventy-first Congress, third sesSion, 3759-3760.
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same time defended his relief measures by
to his wide experience in relief work, both
in the Southern states, and further amplified his phi

This is not an issue as to whether
people shall go hungry or cold in the
United States. It is solely a question
of the best method by which hunger and
cold shall be prevented • • • if the
time should ever come that the voluntary agencies of the country, together
with the local and State governments,
are unable .to find resources with which
to prevent hunger and suffering in my
country, I will ask the aid of every resource of the Federal Government because
I would no more see starvation amongst
our countrymen than would any Senator or
Congressman.
39
The President's message led to talk of a compromise by the
Senate.

The way was opened for Congress and the Executive to get
on common problems.

On February 15 the House and Senate

hed a compromise measure, appropriating $20,000,000, to be
available and to be administered by the Department of
culture for specific purposes, including loans to individuals
in the drought-stricken area for use in the organization of local
agricultural credit corporations, for crop production and further

39 State pa~ers, I, 496-470.
Myers, b. That the President's recommendations were
quate at the time was indicated br, reports "later, that only $35,
000,000 out of the first fund of 145,000,000 ever was used and
only $3,600,000 of the additional fund of $20,000,000. The Red
Cross expended less than $12,000,000 of its privately raised #15,
000,000 fund."
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40
_grlcultural rehabilitation.

The passage of the measure was an

acknowledged victory for the President and his policy.
In contrast with the fortunate events that led to the ulti~ate

victory for the administration regarding the relief plan is

the dispatch with which the veterans' bonus bill was passed over

41

the president's veto.
~eaBure

The President expressed disapproval

on the grounds that the Government would be called upon

to finance loans, which--for the most part--would go to those

42

vere not in distress.

The

di~cussion

of the relative merits of

the bill consumed several days of the third session in which it
appeared that the number of those who favored the bill greatly

40 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, third session, 807-810; 906.
Chicago Daily Tribune, February 10, 1931.
An interesting sidelight on the now famous f1#20,000,000
compromise" appeared in the Chicago Daily Tribune: • • • "Those
who have sat and listened to the criticisms and epithets hurled
at the administration throughout the long controversy over relief
looked on at a scene strange and dramatic.
For they saw and heard Joseph T. Robinson, minority leader, and Thaddeus H. Caraway, Arkansas--two democratic senators-defend President Hoover, express confidence in Secretary of Agriculture Hyde, and applaud the work of the Red Cross.
The two men who have led the fight for relief, who have
been critical to the point of bitterness led the fight today for
the compromise."
41 con~ressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, third sesSion, 584, 17, 734.
This bill, known as the Emergency Adjustment Compensation
Act, was introduced by Senator Bacharach of New Jersey to increas
the loan basis of veterans' certificates to fifty per cent of the
face value of the certificate with a provision that, in no event,
should the rate of interest exceed four and one-half per cent,
cOmpounded annually.
42 Myers, 66.
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outnumbered those who opposed it.
opposition to the proposed bill was expressed by Secretary
the Treasury Andrew Mellon, who asserted that an appropriation
of approximately $1,000,000,000 would be required to meet the
loans coming uP.
a~ailable

Mellon stated that estimates from the best

sources indicated that not more than sixty per cent of

the veterans would avail themselves of the additional privilege
beoause of the terms of the bill and of their desire to retain
the full amount of insurance represented on the face of the cer43
tificate.
At the request "of Senator Smoot of Utah, President Hoover
submitted a statement of his views on the bonus legislation in
whioh he recognized the principle that, when men have been called
upon to place their lives in jeopardy for the nation, the nation
as a whole incurs a special obligation to these men above that to
44
any other group of citizens. But he explained that he did not
think that the country should be called upon to make loans to men
who could support themselves.

He pointed out that it would en-

payment of about $1,300,000,000 from the Federal GovernOf its effect on the relief program he said:
The largest part of this huge sum •
• • is to be available to those who are

43 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, third sesSion, 5076.
44 Ibid., 5375.
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~

not in distress. Such action may • •
• result in prolongation of this period of unemployment and suffering • •
• Placing a strain upon savings needed
Lfor recoverY? • • • by a measure • •
• for a vast sum beyond the call of
distress • • • will not only nullify
the benefits to the veterans but inflict injury to the country as a whole.

45

It was apparent from the beginning of the discussions that
the bill would be passed by both Houses even though the President
made it known that he would veto the measure.

Sentiment in favor

of the legislation was strong among the Republicans who ordinariI,
followed the lead of the Administration.

Even Speaker Longworth

declared that the bill was "safe, sane, and sound and provided a
46

scheme which offered no disturbance to the treasury. 11
From testimony submitted by General Hines, Chief of the
veteran's Bureau, who had already loaned to veterans on their cer·
tificates approximately #330,000,000, it was estimated that over
47
300,000 veterans were out of employment. From the economic standpoint it was argued by those who favored the bill that loan provision would increase purchasing power and therefore help to alleviate hunger, poverty, and unemployment.

Those who opposed the

.1

bill countered that no provision for financing was made in the
bill.

It was a case, they explained, of protecting the financial

45 State Papers, I, 507.
46 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, third sesSion, 734, 1485.

47 Ibid., 5075.
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terests of the country and at the same time relieve distress
thereby damage the financial structure of the country.

48

Aware, no doubt, of the political significance to themselves
veterans at this time, the members of both Houses
the bill on February 26 by large majorities, arguments adagainst it by the President and by the Secretary of the
The President promptly vetoed the meas
and returned it with a message which amplified his former
His disappointment came from the fact that the paythe loans to veterans would incur a heavy tax burden, and
to this undoubtedly was added the disappointment over the failure

of the Republicans in the House to support his efforts to avert
49
further tax burdens. The President's veto message was carefully
analyzed by both Houses and the bill quickly passed over his

50

veto.
Charles G. Dawes, United States ambassador to Great Britain,
in a letter to the President dated March 10, 1931, paid tribute

to the President's statesmanship when he said:
• • • To veto a bonus bill in time of
prosperity is both commendable and
48 Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, third sesSion, 5073-5075.
49 Ibid., q217, 6218, 6304.
50 Ibid., 6230, 6308.
The Senate vote over the veto was seventy-six yeas and
seventeen najs; the House vote, three hundred twenty-eight yeas
and seventy-nine nays. Senators Glass and Vandenberg strove to
sustain the President's veto.

Lie;; .
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courageous. To veto one during the
worst of an unprecedented business
depression, at a time when the bill
• • • could be represented as one to
relieve suffering is an heroic thing-as well as being commendable • • • •
When public opinion was distracted by
conditions temporarily very adverse,
you stood for a principle when you
knew you would go down with it for the
time.
51
The third session of the Seventy-first Congress adjourned on
1931, with many of the pledges for Administrative and
cooperative action unfulfilled.
That the President's efforts to cushion the shock of depreswere effective was indicated in general signs of recovery
the denression toward the end of March, 1931.

Official re-

ports made on March 30 indicating better business prospects and a
oontinued upward trend in employment cheered the President.

Sec-

retary of Labor William N. Doak advised the President that the
gradual business improvement and the upward trend in employment
shown in February had continued through March.

The President's

emergency committee on unemployment reported fewer men out of
work, particularly in MiChigan, the New England states, and in
52
several states of the South. The Federal Reserve Board in January, 1931, reported that bank failures had abated.

The enormous

speculative account in stocks had been liquidated, and the prices
51 Myers, 69-70.
52 ChicagQ Dail! Tribune, March 31, 1931.
In Michigan the pick up in the automobile trades had improved employment.

:g
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f industrial securities in the stock exchange showed a gradual
o
53
increase of about ten per cent in prices from mid-January. The

eIDPloyment improvement in Chicago was reflected in the closing

0

the headquarters of the Government Commission on Unemployment
the transfer of the major part of relief work to re
54
social agencies.
Hardly had the domestic scene begun to show signs of rehabilitation when a new crisis of European origin threatened.
Signs of the impending economic disturbance were apparent first
in stock-market fluctuations.

Beginning in the middle of April

and continuing through May financial pages carried reports of
declining prices in commodities and steady decreases in trade on
the stock-market.

Excerpts taken from the Chicago Daily Tribune

show this progressive downward trend through April and May:
April 16, 1931
PRICES ALL DECLINE - STEEL AT NEW LOW
• • • Most issues broke to new lows •
• • including such redoubtable timber
as United States Steel common which
dropped through the lows of last December.

53 Chicago Daily Tribune, April 4, 1931.
This fact is confirmed in a report on the financial page
of the Chicago Daily Tribune: rtwhereas the monthly average of
commodities compiled by Dun's Reivew had shown a decrease of s
~-tenths of one per cent in March, yesterday's Bradstreet Index
LAp ri1 27 . . . shows an advance of six-tenths of one per cent.
This is the first month since September, 1929, for which
Bradstreet has failed to report a reduction in commodities • • •
Both home and forei~ reviews on the general movement of staple
prices have indicated that the line of resistance has been met."
54 Ibid., March 31, 1931.
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April 26, 1931
Cautious traders continued to back
out of the stock market today and values
once more trended sharply downward. • •
• The finish found the averages flirting
more earnestly with the lows of December
16 last.
May 8, 1931
United States Steel and American
Can, recognized leaders of the list were
depressed to new lows by selling which
reached its peak in the last hour of
trading.
May 15, 1931
United States Steel Lbreaking7 to
a new seven-year low on the New York
board. Uniformly lower prices ruled
throughout the list, but the variations
from the previous day's quotations were
not large. The 65,000-odd shares of
stock which were exchanged represent one
of the lightest trading days on the market in the last twelve months.
An investigation into the cause of the sudden change from
recent favorable outlook revealed that the turn of events in
States was the refle,tion of a rapidly approaching economi
in Germany and Central Europe, in which the burden of reptions and general political instability were salient factors.
er financial crisis was precipitated by the announcement of
55
German-~ustrian Customs Agreement on March 31, 1931.
55 Walter Consuelo Langsam, The World Since 1914. (New York:
Macmillan Company, 1936), 187.
Germany and Austria agreed to abolish customs duties dura transitional period and to levy identical duties on goods
other countries. Fearing an Anschluss LUnion? between the
countries as a result of agreement, France protested--and
ed to prevent its culmination--by offering a needed loan of
1,000,000 to save the Kredit Anstalt from collapse if Austria
uld renounce the plan. Austria declined, obtained money from
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The next step in the European crisis was the announcement on
11, 1931, that the Austrian government had come to the relief
the great Viennese bank, the Credit Anstalt, a bank which conlIed two-thirds of Austria's bank resources and--through its
1nvestments--controlled a large share of her industry.

This bank

close relations with the large banks in Berlin, London, Paris
56
in most European capitals as well as those in New York.
The news of the difficulties of Credit Anstalt led to a wi
of short-time credits and very soon endangered the stabilother European banks.

The financial condition of all Cen-

tral European countries remained critical and definitely affect
the United States.

57

Especially was this true of Germany,

of circumstances--the influence of communists
at home and French diplomatic relations--made manda-

56 The American Year Book, 1931, 23.

57 Myers, 74, 75.

A large number of banks in the United States had loaned
an aggregate sum of from #1,200,000,000 to #1,500,000,000 on this
short-term paper from countries in Central Europe on the assumption that it was a normal advance in export trade. Actually, a
great deal of the short-term money had been invested in capital
improvements--and therefore could not be paid on demand.
Another factor affecting the United States--and perhaps
the one most directly affecting our financial system--was the
practice by foreign governments and foreign national banks of
sending their gold reserves abroad on deposit, thereby earning i
terest on their reserves. There was on deposit in this country
gold or currency reserves from foreign countries and foreign national banks amounting to about #1,500,000,000, which our institutions had loaned to citizens, or on doubtful short loans to
other countries. When foreign depositors demanded this money,
American banks--unable to collect the bills of other countries-had to call domestic loans, thereby causing a drain on our whole
financial system.
.
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tory extraordinary measures within the country to avert economic

An agreement participated in by the Bank for International
settlements, the Federal Reserve Bank, and the central banks of
theD of the Central European countries tried to meet the emerg

arranging for an extension of large credit to the National
Germany ffie ReichsbanlV and also for a restriction on the
58
of short-time loans. Despite every effort to prevent
disaster, affairs in Germany--aggravated by the exigencies aris
the Austrian crisis--grew steadily worse.

A very integral

of this whole financial disintegration in Europe was the
t of German reparations to the European Allies.

A report

the President showed that the total annual interest payments
repara~ions

and inter-governmental debts amounted to about
This was proving to be an almost insurmountable

n on international exchange and currency stability.
owed to the United States amounted to about $250,000,000.

The sum
59

In an attempt to relieve this heavy financial burden, which
was devitalizing the financial and economic stability of Europe
and threatening our own financial equilibrium, President Hoover-early in June--met with Cabinet-members, Secretaries Mills, Mel, and Stimson, to whom he outlined a plan for the suspension
58 The American Year Book, 1931, 23.

59 Myers, 83-90.
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~ll

inter-governmental debts for one year.

Because Congress

not in session LInternational agreements required the approva
oongres~7

and the President wished to have the plan effective

. (rom the beginning of the fiscal year, July 1, when the next debt
installments were due, it was necessary to secure the approval of
60
ers of Congress before taking official action. Since Senator
binson, Democratic leader of the Senate, and John N. Garner,
was slated to be Speaker of the House, refused their approval
the president--between June 18 and 19--telephoned to thirty out_town

Con~ressional

leaders with reference to the proposed mo

torium in order to make sure of enough Democratic votes to carry
Certain senators consulted by the President dishis plans to the Press--necessitating President Hoover's
ving publicity to the moratorium before the foreign governments
informed.

1I~~,~~.cssly

As a result, the President
61
criticized for lack of diplomatic courtesy.

Excerpts from the moratorium, released to the Press by President Hoover on Sunday morning, June 20, 1931, included the folsignificant statements:
• • • The American Government proposes
the postponement during one year of all
payments on inter-governmental debts,

60 Myers, 91-92.
The American Year Book, 1931,
61 Myers, 91, 92.
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reparations and relief debts, both
principal and interest, of course
not including obligations of governments held by private parties. Subject to confirmation by Congress, the
American Government will postpone all
payments upon the debts of foreign
governments to the American Government
payable during the fiscal year beginning July 1st next, conditional on a
like postponement for one year of all
payments on inter-governmental debts
owing the important creditor powers.

...................

The world-wide depression has affected the countries of Europe more
severely than our own. Some of these
countries are feeling to a serious extent the drain of this depression on
national economy. The fabric of intergovernmental debts, supportable in normal times, weighs heavily in the midst
of this depression.

..............

. .

...

I do not approve in any remote
sense of the cancellation of the debts
to us. World confidence would not be
enhanced by such action. • • 62
Approbation of the President's action was almost universal.
The President telegraphed to all members of the Senate and House
whose approval he had not previously asked, and nearly all responded favorable.

Prime Minister Ramsay Mac Donald commented

that it was "an action of great wisdom, courage and deep insight.
Newspapers throughout the country, with scarcely any dissent, expressed approval.

Immediate improvement followed the issuance of

the moratorium; prices on the stock market rose from three to el
ven pOints, wheat rose from four to five cents a bushel; retail
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improved, and unemployment began to decrease.

63

Interesting

ts in newspapers and periodicals included those of Arthur
Henning:
That President Hoover's new program of international policies is fraught
with far-reaching consequences to the
world generally, to the United States in
particular, and to the President's political future--most particularly, appears to
be the common opinion, not only of those
who point to it with pride, but also of
those who view it with alarm.

·............ ........

The step taken by the President in
proposing a one year holiday in the payment of German reparations and allied war
debts is being hailed by his friends and
foes alike as a turning point in world
history.
64
of Allan Nevins appearing in an article in Current His-

• • • Very little leadership entered
into his dramatic stroke of June, 1931,
in announcing the one-year moratorium
on reparations and war debts.

·....... .......

. . . .

..

Nevertheless, the moratorium was a great
achievement. Next to the Washington Conference and its treaties, it was the
greatest single achievement by an American President since Wilson left the White
House. . . • 65

63 The American

Year~,

1931, 3, 4.

64 Chicago Daily Tribune, July 27, 1931.
65 Nevins, Current History, 36: 393-394.
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countries affected by the moratorium readily agreed to the
~rlU.r) __ ents

with the exception of France; but, after careful de-

beration, she too agreed to cooperate with the plan.
July 6, 1931.

66

While the moratorium

affor~ed

This was

temporary relief

tension in inter-national affairs, it did not offer the
to the complicated financial and economic problems, eiwithin Germany or on the international scene.

The end of

found the constructive effects of the moratorium on the wane
rmation made available to the President at this time revealed
the prices of industrial stocks had fallen fifteen points
their moratorium recovery; that the prices of wheat, cotton,
livestock were down to the lowest point in years; and that
loyment had increased by an additional 500,000 since March,
67
total to about 7,000,000.

66 Myers, 95-98

"ffiy June 221 the British, Italian, Rumanian, German, Jap
se, Polish, Czech, Finnish, New Zealand, Hungarian, Austrran,
gian, Swedish, Canadian, and Greek governments had now acted the moratorium."
.
France was unwilling at first to accept the terms of the
ratorium because~of her annual reparations par.ment from Germany,
ch amounted to about $130,000,000 including 'unconditional rep
tions" and "reparations in kind." A preferable plan for France
uld have been a moratorium for the Allies while Germany contind to pay her obligations to France.

67 Ibid., 211.

100
Suggestions for the oa11ing of a speoial session of Congres
to deal with the problem were turned down by the President, but
~e

took steps to give some Federal support to the relief work al68
ready in progress. On August 19, 1931, the President instruoted
~

the new ohairman of the President's Unemployment Relief Organization, Walter S. Gifford, to set up an organization adequate to
care for the needy during the ooming winter.

"The whole foroes

the Administration are at your disposal," the President oon69
eluded.
In September the nation was oonfronted with another great
crisis as a result of the suspension of the gold standard by
70
t Britain. The extent to whioh this affeoted the United
states is best desoribed in a report of the Federal Reserve Board

68 Brown, Current History, 36: 415.
69 Myers, 114, 115.
Walter S. Gifford, President of the American Telephone
Telegraph Company, had been appointed by the President to succeed
lonel Arthur Woods, who had resigned.
70 Paul M. Mazur, "The Gold Crisis: its Causes and Significanoe," Current History, 35: 167-169, November, 1931.
"For a long time there had been a drain on the gold reserves of the Bank of England and during this same period the
gold basis for currency established by Parliament in 1925 had be
threatened. With the misfortunes of her debtors the flow of gold
into the English coffers lessened and finally, with the freezing
of German short-term loans, the assets of many banks and the
slight but adverse effect of the German moratorium, the gold reserves of the Bank of England reached a danger point in August,
1931 • • • Funds were withdrawn in $100,000,000 amounts. France
alone withdrew $125,000,000 in gold on July 24, acoording to a
BS statement.1t
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Suspension of the gold standard
in England not only tended to mobilize
foreign balances still held in London
but also to impair confidence in such
balances held elsewhere and to cause
European banks to convert large portions of their foreign funds into gold.
Since a large part of the realizable
short-term foreign balances of the world
was held in the United states, it was
largely upon this country that this movement then concentrated. As a consequence,
the United States lost $725,000,000 gold
from the middle of September to the end
of October. About three-fifths of this
amount was taken by France, the bulk of
the remainder by Belgium, Switzerland,
and Netherland. These are the countries
that had been drawing heavily on the Bank
of England reserves.
To a considerable extent this movement reflected the desire'of the central
banks in these countries to increase their
metallic reserves with a view to showing
a stronger gold position.
71
Apprehension was intensified by the exodus of gold from the
United States, and people in every part of the country began
hoarding gold until a total of over a billion dollars in gold and
currency was taken out of circulation.

Conditions were further

aggravated by the abandonment of the gold standard by Denmark,
Sweden, Norway, Columbia, Bolivia, and India and by exchange restrictions in Greece, Italy, Germany, Austria,

Hun~ary

as well as by a number of import restrictions on trade.

and Chile
The sus-

picion that the united States would follow the example of Great

71 Eighteenth Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board,
United States Government Printing Office, 1932, 11.

i
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aritain led to a continued heavy withdrawal of gold and exchange
the United States.

This heavy drain on the banks forced

to call in loans and to seek increased credit from the FedReserve system.

Hoarding increased to an estimated rate of

a week, and new bank failures were reported daily.
were on the verge of panic, and many--alarmed over the inin bank failures--rushed to the banks to withdraw their
thereby further jeopardizing the bank reserves.

The

inadequacy of the Federal Reserve system to meet this unprecedented emergency and the weakness in our banking system generally
revealed.
It was evident to the President that the needs of the coundemanded the adoption of some unprecedented measures.

Acco

1ngly, with the advice of Cabinet members and other advisers, a
broad program was agreed upon to meet the new situation.

This in

eluded conferences with heads of the leading insurance companies,
heads of the Clearing House banks in New York, and a meeting with
ranking members of banking, finance, and other committees in both
Houses of Congress.

73

In placing the problem before the financial

leaders, the President pointed out salient points.
his report included:

72 Wilbur, 413.

73 Myers, 124-126.

Excerpts from
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• •• the situation since the British
collapse ten days ago is apnroaching
disaster at an accelerated speed until
it has reached a panic condition.

,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.

• • • The Federal Reserve system is
expanding credit by every device to
meet the sapping of our credit foundations • • • the fears of the people
were, since the British failed ten
days ago, expressed in unprecedented
hoarding of currency • . .

·....... ..... .

. . .

..

• •• But beyond this, the banks in
the large centers are calling interior
loans to fortify themselves against
foreign drains • • • the secondary banking centers being drained are fortifying themselves against it by calling
loans from country banks and customers.
· .the imminent collapse of banks threatens in many interior centers particularly
in the south and mid-west. • •
• •• In all, a senseless "bankers I panic ll
and public fears are contributing to
dragging the country down.
74
His plan included the creation of a national credit association with a credit of $500,000,000 to support the financial
structure, lito be subscribed by all the banks in a ratio of two
per cent of their depositsll and an agreement not to foreclose on
mortgages of farmers and home-owners who were making an effort
to pay.

President Hoover stated that he would call Congress into

special session and bring in government support if the bankers
rejected the plan.

Opinions on this plan were divided, but the

bankers--after considering the idea--sent word to the Fresident

74 Myers, 126.

1

on october 5 that they would form the organization.

75

The Presi-

dent also decided to recommend to Congress an appropriation of

1125 ,000,000

to strengthen the land banks, to be used as a re-

fund.

At a meeting with about thirty Congressional leaders the
reviewed the whole economic situation and outlined the
pro~ram

for relief.

The cooperation of Congress in the forth-

ooming session of the Seventy-second Congress (in which there
Democratic majority) was essential to the success of
the relief program.

The course pursued at that session will be

delineated in the next chapter.

Some object10n was expressed

over setting up a governmental f1nancial agency similar to the
Finance Corporation and to the foreclosure policy of the
Federal Land Banks, but on the whole, the meeting was looked
as "a SUbstantial achievement."

76

Because of its significance, the relief program as outlined
by the President 1s quoted here:

1. To mobilize the banking resources
of the country to meet these conditions,
I request the bankers of the nation to
form a national institution of at least
$500,000,000. The purpose of this institution to be the rediscount of banking
assets not now eligible for rediscount at
the Federal Reserve Banks in order to as-

75 Myers, 127.
76 Ibid., 126-130.
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sure our banks, being sound, that
they may attain liquidity in case of
necessity, and thereby enable them
to continue their business without
the restriction of credits or the saorifice of their assets. I have submitted my proposal to the leading bankers of New York. I have been advised
by them that it will receive their support, and that at my request they will
assume the leadership in the formulation of such an organization. Themembers of the New York City Clearing House
Association have unanimously agreed to
oontribute their share by pledging $15 0 ,
000,000, which is two per cent of their
net demand and time deposits. I have
been assured from other large centers,
as far as I have been able to reach, of
their support also. I oonsider that it
is in the national interest, inoluding
the interest of all individual banks and
depositors, that all the banks of the
country should support this movement to
their full responsibility. It is a movement of national assurance and of unity
of action in an American way to assist
business, employment, and agriculture.
2. On September 8th, I requested the
governors of the Federal Reserve Banks
to endeavor to secure the co-operation
of the bankers of their territory to
make some advances on the security of the
assets of closed banks or to take over
some of these assets in order that the
receivers of those banks may pay some dividends to their depositors in advance of
what would otherwise be the case pending
liquidation. Suoh a measure will contribute to free many business activities and
to relieve many families from hardship over the forthcoming winter, and in a measure reverse the prooess of deflation involved in the tying up'of deposits. Several of the districts have already made
considerable progress to this end, and I
request that it should be taken up vigorously as a oommunity responsibility.
3. In order that the above program of
unification and solidarity of action may

106
be carried out and that all parts of the
country be enlisted, I request the governors of the Federal Reserve Banks in each
district to secure the appOintment of
working committees of bankers for each _
Reserve district to co-operate with the
New York group and in carrying out the
other activities which I have mentioned.
4. I shall propose to the Congress that
the eligibility provisions of the Federal
Reserve Act should be broadened in order
to give greater liquidity to the assets
of the banks, and thus a greater assurance to the bankers in the granting of
credits by enabling them to obtain legitimate accommodation on sound security in
times of stress. Such measures are already under consideration by the Senate
Committee upon Currency and Banking.
5. Furthermore, if necessity requires,
I will recommend the creation of a finance
corporation similar in character and purpose to the War Finance Corporation, with
available funds sufficient for any legitimate call in support of credit.
6. I shall recommend to Congress the
subscription of further capital stock by
the government to the Federal Land Banks
(as was done at their founding) to strengthen their resources so that, on the one hand,
the farmer may be assured to auch accommodation as he may require and, on the other
hand, their credit may be of such high character that they may obtain their funds at
low rates of interest.
7. I have submitted the above-mentioned
proposals which require legislation to the
members of Congress, whose attendance I
was able to secure on short notice at the
evening's meeting--being largely the members of committees particularly concerned-and they approve of them in principle.
8. Premier Laval of France is visiting
the United states. It is my purpose to
discuss with him the question of such further arrangements as are imperative during
the period of the depression in respect of
inter-governmental debts. The policy of
the American Government in this matter is
well-known, and was set out by me in public statement on June 20th in announcing
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the American proposal for a year's
postponement of debt payments. Our
problem in this respect is one of such
adjustment during the period of depression as will at the same time aid our
own and world recovery. This being a
subject first of negotiation with foreign governments was not submitted for
determination at this evening's conference.
9. The times call for unity of action
on the part of our people. We have met
with great difficulties not of our own
making. It requires determination to overcome these difficulties and above all to
restore and maintain, confidence. Our people owe it not only to themselves and in
their own interest, but they can by such
an example of stability and purpose give
hope and confidence in our own country
and to the rest of the world.
77
A summary of the general economic condition of the country
in November, 1931, reveals that the downward

tre~d

of business

activity and security values had not been entirely checked nor
had unemployment decreased in spite of optimistic reports that
~the

United States is at last emerging from its economic depres-

slon."

According to R. G. Dun and Company, business failures de-

clined from 2362 in October to 2195 in November, showing an increase of eight and one-tenth per cent over November, 1930.

The

total value of exports for October, 1931, showed a drop of $121,
896,000 over the exports for the same month in 1930--although the
October exports in 1931 had increased $25,000,000 over those in
September, 1931.
Bank failures declined perceptibly in November from the rec-

77 State Paners II, 4.
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ord of five hundred twelve for October.

A survey of the Americ

sapkers' Association on November 15 showed a decline in the na.
tiOP's savings deposits of #270,085,000 for the year ended June
Bank failures resulted in an increase of #67,000,000
in the Postal Savings System.

On November 17 the American Fede

,tiO n of Labor's monthly survey estimated the number of unemat 6,200,000.

A week later President William Green pre-

that 7,500,000 would be out of work in January.

One en-

couraging fact was that the increase for November, 1931, had be
78
greater than is usual at that time of year.
The responsibility placed upon the President during the
grave crisis involving the financial structure of the country re
a hitherto unrecognized quality of leadership in the Pres
Overlooking partisanship and politics, he worked with
small groups of leaders of finance and industry and pushed forward programs that offered a timely and appropriate solution to
79
difficult details of the problem.
From the evidence presented in this chauter it is obvious
that misunderstanding resulted in an almost incredible amount of
mischief being done to the amiable relations of Congress and
80
President Hoover. Members of Congress--anxious to vindicate

78 E. Francis Brown, tlMr. Hoover Faces Nation's PrOblems,"
Current History, 35:578-580, January, 1932.
79 See page 7, Chapter I.
80 See footnote 14 in Chapter I.
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tb6Wselves in the eyes of their constituents, and wholly unprep~red

for the stubborn taciturnity displayed by the President--

!~iled

to realize that his attitude was probably conditioned by
81
background and training. When a sympathetic analysis with

President might have won Hoover to the Congressional viewpoint, criticism--vitriolic in its effect upon the sensitive Q

et

President--was directed at him and left him unable to adjust

biwself gracefully to the impetuous reasoning of Congress.

On

the other hand, had the President been more politic in his attihe might have rationalized Congressional behavior to the
where he could realize the criticism for what it was--a
normal reaction of Congress when violently opposed to Administrative proposals.

81 See footnotes 19 and 37 in Chapter I.

i

CHAPTER IV

!

EVIDENCES OF PARTISANSHIP IN CONGRESS, 1931-1933
At the approach of the opening of the Seventy-second Congress in December, 1931, the nation was still confronted with
problems calling for emergency measures.

It was apparent before

the end of November that the enlarged program for relief already
under consideration would have to be carried into action if another crisis was to be averted.

Congress convened on December 7

with the Democrats in control of the House for the first time in
twelve years.

The Democrats held two hundred nineteen seats,

while the Republicans numbered two hundred fourteen, fifteen of
whom were Progressives, and the Farm-Laborites one.

Changes in

leadership included the selection of John N. Garner, Democrat of
Texas, for Speaker; Bertrand N. Snell of New York to replace John

Q. Tilson as Republican floor leader; and Henry T. Rainey of 111inois, Democratic floor leader.

The Senate was comprised of

forty-seven Democrats, forty-eight Republicans, including twelve
Progressives and one Farm-Labor vote.
Senate, although as far as the

Republicans organized the

President was concerned, it was

only nominally Republican inasmuch as the coalition of Progressives and Democrats would number from fifty to sixty, giving them
1

a majority.
1 Brown, Current
Myers, 146.

Histor~,
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In spite of the indioations of another downward trend in
bUsiness and general eoonomio oonditions, the President's annual
to Congress delivered on Deoember 8 was not without hope
ooming months.

In it he set the stage for the program of

legislation he expeoted to have passed, reviewed the aooomplishwents and hardships of the past two years, explained the effeot
of world-wide eoonomio disturbanoes on oonditions in the United
states, and stressed the need for oonstruotive and aooelerated
action on all pending relief proposals.

Regarding the eoonomio

conditions of the oountry he said:
• • • The ohief influenoe affeoting
the state of the Union during the past
year has been the oontinued world-wide
eoonomio disturbanoe. Our national oonoern has been to meet the emergenoies it
has oreated for us, and to lay the foundations for reoovery • • •
The eoonomio depression has oontinued and deepened in every part of the
world during the past year. • •
Within two years there have been
revolutions or aoute sooial disorders in
nineteen oountries, embraoing more than
half the population of the world. • •
• . • any effort to bring about our own
reouperation has diotated the neoessity
of oooperation by us with other nations
in reasonable effort to restore world oonfidenoe and eoonomio stability • • •

·.. . ....... ... . . . . .

Although some of the oauses of our depression are due to speoulation, inflation of
seourities and real estate, unsound foreign investments and mismanagement of finanoial institutions, yet our self-oontained national eoonomy, with its matohless strength and resouroes, would have
enabled us to reoover long sinoe but for
the oontinued dislooations, shooks, and
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setback from abroad. • •
• . • if we can put our financial resources to work and can ameliorate the
financial situation in the railways, I
am confident we can make a large measure
of recovery independent of the rest of
the world.
2
Among the measures singled out for Congressional action in
the interests of bringing about economic stability were a subscription by the treasury of further canital to the Federal Land
Banks, establishment of a system of home-loan discount banks as
a necessary companion to the financial structure of the Federal
Reserve Board and the Federal Land Banks, and the establishment
of an emergency reconstruction corporation of the nature of the
former War Finance Corporation.

The President indic.ated that

penditures on public works, as an aid to unemployment would increase from $260,000,000 in 1928 to $780,000,000 during the calendar year.

3

The President's message for the fiscal year beginning July
1 recommended a decrease in appropriations of $369,000,000 with
a modification of existing law authorizing further appropriati
and an increase of $1,300,000,000 in tax revenues by taxes on
amusements, automobiles and conveyances, and a substantial in4

crease in income and estate taxes.
The message on December 10, submitting the moratorium on i

2 State Papers, II, 42-44.

3 Ibid.
4
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ternational debts for formal approval of Congress, requested
"that a law be enacted before December 15, .Li9317 , authorizing
the Secretary of the Treasury--with the approval of the President--to postpone all payments due us on account of debts owed
forei~n

governments to the United States Government during the

year ending June 10, 1932, and to provide for their payment over
5
a ten-year period beginning July 1, 1932."
It was to be expected that this message would be received
with mixed feelings by the members of Congress inasmuch as the
sentiment in both Houses was markedly Democratic and there' had
been a growing tendency in the last few months to discredit the
President.

The fact that unemployment and hardship continued

and even increased caused many to lose faith in President Hoover's policies and his repeated assurances of recovery.

Opposi-

tion to the moratorium had mounted in the months since individ
6
Oongressmen had given it their sanction. The feeling was widespread that foreign countries should not be released from their
debts while the American people were still in want.

Anxious to

please their constituents and concerned over the effect their
actions on this issue would have on their chances for reelection
many Congressmen returned to Washington prepared to oppose it.
Evidences of opposition were quickly revealed in speeches
of a political and partisan nature attacking the measure, as we

5 Congressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, first session, 297.
6 See account referred to in Chapter III footnotes 62 63.
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the President's method of handling it while Congress was not
session.

Both the President and the Republican party were

attacked by Representative Oliver, Democrat, who claimed that the
president set out to redeem a promise to abolish poverty yet all
that could be found in his recent message was a "gruesome account
of disaster unprecedented in the history of the nation which had
befallen the country under Republican guidance."

When Repre-

sentative Wood, Republican of Indiana, urged the House members
to stand by the President, Oliver replied with taunts about the
way the Republicans "stood by" the President on the tariff issue.
He continued:
• • • His own message confesses his
disastrous failure • • • the greatest
constructive service that can be rendered to the American people would be
the obliteration of the Republican
party. ••
7
Representative Rankin, Democrat from MisSissippi, who predicted that one of the hardest battles in Congress would likely
be

over the moratorium, said that if the President wanted this

question taken up he should have called a special session of Congress in June.

Representative Wood intimated that such a course

might have added to the afflictions of the people, if Congress
had been there all summer "wrangling • • • as we are wrangling
now."

When Representative Rankin said in a threatening manner

7 Congressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, first session, 339, 340.
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that he doubted that the measure would be passed by December 15,
Ilif at all,1t Representative Wood again replied • • • "Is this

tbe character of support the Democratic side is going to give
tbe administration for the purpose of relieving the economic
8
conditions of the Country?"
It was the sentiment of Representative Crowe, of Indiana,
and others that--while world-wide conditions are always a matter
of concern--the money, something over $300,000,000 per year, due
9
us from Europe was needed to assist people in our own country.
The demonstration of partisan feeling was regretted by Representative LaGuardia, Progressive from New York, who observed
that the Seventy-second Congress "had indeed made a bad start,"
and in his remarks declared "this is no time for Democratic or
Republican politics and political speeches."

He believed that

the crisis confronting the country was as serious as it was when
Woodrow Wilson called a special session of Congress before the
World War.

He advised the members to "stop all this • • •

ize our committees and get down to work."

0

While he did not qual

ify as a supnorter of the administration, according to his own
statement, he noted that there were "startling statements in the
President's message which should immediately absorb the attenti

8 Congressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, first session, 336, 338.
9 Ibid., 336.
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of Congress."

Among those he singled out were a sounder bank

System and changes in banking laws and in the Federal Reserve
System.
The situation is very serious LEe
continueg7 • • • it is not the success
of the Democratic party and it is not
the success of the Renublican party.
It is the very preservation of the
Union.
10
It was idle to talk about it, he felt, when spokesmen from both
parties had appeared and publicly approved of the moratorium of
one year.

He reminded his colleagues that
• • • the President took all partisan
politics out of the question by first
consulting and obtaining the approval
of leading and authorative spokesmen
of both parties • • • 11

Others in the House expressed regret that partisanship was
running so high in the debate on the moratorium but expressed
hope that the President's program, if accepted by Congress, wo
12

check the "cruel liquidation,"

Senator Blaine, of Wisconsin,

like many others including Senators Couzens, LaFollette, and Co
nally claimed that the joint resolution before the Senate was not
the same proposition indicated to the members of Congress in

10 Congressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, first ses
sion, 342, 343.
11 Ibid., 343.
12 .!:Q14., 484.
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June, 1931.

They objected to the provision for "the payment ovel

a ten-year period, beginning July 1, 1932.11

It took a good deal

of patient explaining by Under Seoretary of the Treasury Mills
before these men and others in the Senate were convinced that it
was never expected that all the payments due in 1932 would be
paid in full in 1933, along with the payment due for that year.

In defense of his own and the President's action, Under Secretary Mills explained, apparently to their satisfaction, that:
• • • in order to save what we thought
was a world oatastrophe it became necessary to relieve all debtors from international debts.
13
Senator Blaine's critioism of the President's action inferred
that there had been a serious infraction of the separation of
powers principle:
• • • let this practice be oarried but
one step farther and we shall have in
Amerioa a dictatorship without, and beyond, and over, and above the Constitution and the laws.

· . . No. .one. .of. these
..... .....
ithree7 departLOf

ments
governmen!7 should trespass
the field of any other department. ••

14

Despite all the oontroversy the law was enacted and signed
by the President on December 23, authorizing the moratorium but
I

I

13 Congressional Reoord, Seventy-second Congress, first session, 1107.

I

I:'
[I

14 Ibid., 1112.
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declaring agaonst any further postponment of the paying of debts.
The amendment proposed to the Senate read:
• • • it is the sense of Congress that
there should be no further moratorium,
no additional cancellation in whole or
in part of the debts mentioned in this
joint resolution.
15
The attitude displayed toward the measure by the Congressmen in
session bears out the observation that, had President Hoover not
taken the precaution to obtain the support of as many Congressme
as possible and had they not committed themselves in advance,
they would surely not have voted for the plan when it came before
16
.
Congress. None of the acknowledged administration leaders had
stood up in support of the measure during the heated debates over
17
its approval.
Congress adjourned for the Christmas holidays on December 22
with the most important relief measures still awaiting legislative action.

Due to the existing crisis the President had urged

the Congressmen to curtail or forego a Christmas recess, but the
Senate--after first defeating a motion of Senator Borah to reconvene on December 28--agreed to concur with the House decision to
18
reconvene on January 4, 1932. Disturbed over the delay thus occasioned and impatient for action, the President addressed anothe
15 Congressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, first sesSion, 1931.
16
, "When Congress Roars", Review of Reviews, 82:23,
January 9, 1932.
17 Congressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, first sesSion, 1118.
18 Ibid
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~essage

to Congress exhorting them to act with dispatch on the

relief program in which the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
~eld an important place.

The message delivered on January 4 and

referred to the Committee on Banking and Currency called attention to the non-partisan nature of the program:
• • • I should be derelict in my duty
if I did not at this time emphasize the
paramount importance to the Nation of
constructive action upon these questions
at the earliest possible moment. These
recommendations have been largely developed in consultation with leading men of
both parties, of agriculture, or labor,
the bases for full collaboration to effect these purposes. They have no partisan character. We can and must replace
the unjustifiable fear in the country by
confidence.

·................ ...

• • • Combating a depression is indeed
like a great war in that it is not a battle upon a single front but upon many
fronts. Our people through voluntary
measures and through state and local action are providing for distress • • • Our
duty is so to supplement these steps as
to make their efforts more fruitful.

·...................

Action in these matters by the Congress will go far to reestablish confidence, to restore the functioning of our
economic system, and to rebuilding of
prices and values and to q"uickening employment. Our justified hope and confidence for the future rest upon unity of
our people and of the government in prompt
and courageous action.
19
Heeding, albeit reluctantly, the President's persistent prod
ings, both Houses proceeded to take action on the measure to pro19 .::::.!::.~~~~~= Record, Seventy-second Conp:ress, first sesaton, 11
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1fide for the creation of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.
Tb e purpose of the corporation was to provide financial facilities for financial institutions, to aid in financing agriculture
20
oommerce, and industry and for other purposes. While deliberations on the measure dealt largely with questions concerning the
method of selecting members of the board of directors, benefits
to be derived by banks and farmers in different sections of the
oountry and with the adequacy or inadequacy of the bill to meet
the needs for which it was intended, much time was consumed with
oriticism or a partisan nature.

Earlier mistakes of omission

and commission by the Administration were dwelt upon.

The Pres-

ident was criticized again for not calling a special session of
Congress to deal with the emergency measures in the summer and
fall of 1931.

The plan evolved by President Hoover with the aid

of bankers, Congressmen and financial experts to save the finanoial structure of the country in October, 1931, was referred to
20 Congressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, first ses
sion, 25 27, 2537.
The bill provided for "the creation of a body corporate,
with the name "Reconstruction Finance Cornoration." It was to
have capital stock of #500,000,000 subscribed by the United
States of America. The management was vested in a board of directors consisting of the Secretary of the Treasury, or in his
absence the Under Secretary of the Treasury, the governor of the
Federal Reserve Board, and the Farm Loan CommiSSioner, as memb
ex-officio; and four other persons appointed by the President of
the United States with the consent of the Senate. Not more than
four of the seven members were to be chosen from anyone political party and not more than one from anyone federal reserve dis
trict. The Corporation was authorized to borrow up to $1,500,
OOO,OOO--or an amount not to exceed three times the assets--for
the purpose of making loans to banks, railroads, agriculture,
industries, and other businesses.
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Street--Hooverian Plan."

Conditions under which the

Banking and Currency were working to prepare and re21
the bill were termed Ita forced draft" by Senator Bankhead.
During the first weeks of January President Hoover conferred
Congressional leaders, including Senator Glass and Representative Steagall, chairman of the Committees on Banking and Cur
rency, in their respective Houses, to secure their cooperation in
passing the bill to check further deflation.

Renresentative

steagall and others promised they would do all they could to put
through the emergency bill.

A statement to the press following

this meeting expressed the President's feeling at this time:
The developments of the past week
should give great assurances to the
country. The public statements of the
Renublican and Democratic leaders of
the Senate and House show a real nonpartisan determination in cooperation
with the Administration to assure the
country of the balancing of the Federal
expenditures and income for the fiscal
year beginning July 1st.

........... ...

• • • With the assurances which have now
been given from the leaders in Congress
I do not believe there is any ground for
apprehension by the public from the flood
of extravagant proposals which have been
introduced there. It is true that these
bills would imply an increase of Government expenditure during the next five
years of over forty billions of dollars
or more than eight billions per annum.
The great majority of these bills have
been advanced by some organization or some
sectional interest and are little likely
to see the light of day from congression-
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al committees. They do, however, represent a spirit of spending in the country
which must be abandoned.
22
llepresentative Steagall, who was a member of the ma"ori ty partly
iDemocra17 in the House was complimented by Representative Strong
of Kansas for keeping his word.

A bill passed by the House on

December 22, providing Federal aid to Land Banks had been intro.

23

duced by Representative Steagall.

That the passage of these meas·

ures was secured was due, in large measure, to the President's
contacts with small groups of influential Congressmen.
After the passage of the bill was assured, although not forma.lly acted, upon by the Senate, leading newspapers announced the
appOintment by the President of General Charles G. Dawes as Presi.
dent of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and Eugene Meyer ae
chairman of the Board.

Since the measure provided for appoint-

ments by the Board of Directors, the question.was raised in the
Senate on January 22 as to whether this was "a usurpation of
24

power" by President Hoover.

By January 16 passage of the bill was

assured although it was not approved by the Senate and sent to the
~resident

until January 22.

In a press statement on this occasior.

22 State Papers, II, 105.
23 Congressional Reoord, Seventy-second Congress, first ses~1on, 1749.
24 Ibid., 2510.

EXPlanation given to the Senate in answer to this query
that the President had acted ahead of time in order to secure
~eneral Dawes's accentance of the position in place of the posi'~1on he held at the head of the United states delegation to the
~18armament conference in Geneva.
Publicity was given to the a~
~ointment to prevent misunderstanding abroad when General Dawes
failed to show up at Geneva the next day.
~as
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president Hoover reoognized the efforts of Congressmen who had
belped in seouring its passage when he said:
• • • In attaohing my signature to
this extremely important legislation,
I wish to pay tribute to the patriotism of the men in both Houses of Congress who have given proof of their
devotion to the welfare of their oountry irrespeotive of po1itioa1 affiliation. • • ~This ao!7 brings into being
a powerful organization with adequate
resouroes, able to strengthen weaknesses that may develop in our oredit, banking, and railway struoture • . •
• • • It is not oreated for the aid of
big industries-or banks • • • It is
oreated for the support of the smaller
banks and finanoia1 institutions • • • 25
The dispatoh with whioh this bill was passed surpassed that
shown in handling any administration measure in the following
months.

Had the President delayed his reoommendations until

Maroh, the ohanoes of their being passed might have been less
favorable.

It has been thought that a bit of strategy may have

entered into the President's insistenoe on haste in dealing with
the measure sinoe its passage at this time forestalled the passage of legislation, in oonf1iot with the Administration program
mentioned in the President's statement to the press on January
26
8.
Another item on the President's relief program to whioh the
House gave its approval in Deoember was taken up in the Senate
25 State Papers, II, 106, 107.
26 Chamberlain, 295.
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early in January.

This was the measure for strenthening the

Federal Land Bank System.

The bill known as H. R. 617 2 , author-

izing an additional capital of $125,000,000, all to be subscribed by the Government, and setting aside $25,000,000 for extension of time on overdue mortgages, was passed by the Senate
with very little debate of a partisan nature and sent to the
27
president for his signature on January 27.
While passage of the bill fulfilled a need to which the
President called attention in his message to Congress, Representative Steagall claimed authorship for it with a feeling of
pride.

He told the House that he had worked throughout the

former session of Congress to secure favorable action on this
legislation by the Banking and Currency Committee of the House,
but his efforts were thwarted by the Secretary of the Treasury
and the Federal Farm Loan Board, who claimed there was no need
for the legislation.

It was only since October, 1931, he stated

that the Administration committed itself in favor of the legislation and only belatedly did the Administration approve of the
provision for the extension of loans to relieve borrowers.

He

was of the opinion that, if the need had been recognized earlier
it would have saved the homes of thousands of farmers in the
United States whom he said were turned out-of-doors and forced
28
to seek shelter for their families along the highway.
27 Congressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, first ses·
sion, 2417, 2422.
28 Ibid., 2426.
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The great economic strain with which the new year was ushe
in continued to grow deeper.

Unstable economic and currency

conditions in the countries that followed England off the gold
standard were reflected in this country.

New trade barriers to

protect their exchanges reduced purchases from United States and
brought about a drop in prices here.

Continued withdrawal of

deposits from this country by European countries was causing a
heavy drain on the gold reserve.

While the Federal Reserve Sys-

tem did all it couilid to cope with the situation, its power was
limited.

Throughout the month of January bank failures and

hoarding increased on a large scale.
the failure of solvent banks.

Runs on banks were causing

In order to protect their reserve

banks felt forced to restrict credit and to reduce loans.

Figure

showed that unemployment had increased to approximately 10,000,
000 before the end of January.

Realizing that the situation was

rapidly approaching the danger stage, the President decided that
drastic action was needed to stop hoarding and to expedite the
29
liquidation of closed banks.
Leaders from patriotic and civic organizations in all parts
of the country were urged to cooperate in conducting a drive
against hoarding.

In announcing his plans to create a national

organization to conduct the drive, under the leadership of Colone
29 Con~ressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, first session, 4139.
Myers, 159, 165.
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frank Knox of Chicago, President Hoover pointed to the seriousness of the situation when he said:
• • • I am gratified that the very act
of creating the corporation has already
shown results in the dissipation of fear
and the restoration of public confidence,
as indicated by the fact that recently
we have had • . • no increase in hoarding
of currency in the eountry.
There is now a patriotic opportunity
for our citizens unitedly to join in this
campaign against depression • • • Every
dollar returned from hoarding to circulation means putting men to work. It means
help to agriculture and to business.
Everyone hoarding currency injures not
only his own prospects and those of his
family, but is acting contrary to the common good. It is to their own interest
that they should return it to Circulation,
as well as a patriotic service to the
country as a whole. ••
30
This group, meeting at the White House on February 6 to perfect
methods of organization were told by President Hoover that:
Hoarding of currency had accumulated to
the extent of $1,250,000,000 to $1,500,
000,000. Its results had been to immobilize a large portion of the national gold
supply, to cause drastic deflation and credit contraction, seriously to restrict business expansion and maintenance of employment
and affect commodity prices. A large portion of the hoarding was due to misunderstanding of the national effect of such acts.
It arose out of unnecessary fears and apprehension. Nothing could contribute more
• than to restore this money to work.
31
30 Myers, 167.
State Papers, II, 108, 109.
31 Myers, 168.
In the group were C. G. Dawes, President of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Secretary of the Treasury Mills
and Governor Meyer of the Federal Reserve Board.
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Three days later General Dawes, Secretary of the Treasury
and Messrs. Meyer and Harrison of the Federal Reserve
came to the White House to report the precarious state of
gold supply and the "imminent danger to the gold standard."
Due to withdrawal by foreign countries, over $1,000,000,000 of
gold had been taken from the monetary gold stock.

Due to hoard-

ing, the Reserve currency against which gold and eligible paper
must be held had increased by $1,500,000,000 above normal.

A

memorandum presented to the President showed that the amount of
gold which could be paid out to foreigners had been reduced to
32
#433,000,000. Emergency action seemed imperative. Acting with
haste, the President summoned Senators Watson and Robinson, Senate Republican and Democratic floor leaders respectively, and
Senators Glass, Bulkley, Walcott and Townsend to meet with these
men at the White House the following day.

The President pointed

out the graveness of the situation and urged immediate legislation.

After three hours of discussion a legislative program was

agreed upon.

Senator Glass, who was interested in a general

Bank Reform Bill, agreed at this time to do his "patriotic duty"
and introduce a bill covering the emergency points except one
making provision for loans to closed banks. LHe planned to include such a provision in the Bank Reform Bill~7 In order to ex-

32 Myers, 169.
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pedite the measure through the House and to give it no tinge of
partisanship, President Hoover suggested that Representative
steagall introduce the bill in the House.

33

Because of the seriousness of the situation, much of the i
formation divulged at the meeting could not be made public.

On-

ly those points which were pertinent to the measure were explained to the members of the Senate and House.

Willingness of

Oongressmen, therefore, to approve the measure prepared by the
Bank and Currency Committee depended largely upon their faith in
the integrity and Judgment of Representative Steagall and Senator Glass.

Senator Glass carried out his promise and handled

the matter in a praiseworthy manner.

The bill, known as the

Glass-Steagall Bill and designed to improve the facilities of
the Federal Reserve System for the service of commerce, industry
and agriculture and to provide means for meeting the needs of
member banks in exceptional circumstances and for other purposes
was approved by the House and introduced in the Senate by Senator Glass on February 11.

34

Aside from objection to the secrecy of the testimony given
to the House Committee and to there being no Senate hearings on
the bill, deliberations dealt with comments on the amendments to

33 Myers, 172.

34 Congressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, second
seSSion, 3734.
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tb e bill and questions regarding the conditions of the ba~ks.
senator Glass told the Senate that, since he could explai~ the
provisions of the bill, being thoroughly familiar with it, and i~
~iew of the existing emergency, he considered hearings on the

bill unnecessary.

To those who objected to the secrecy of the

testimony he explained:
The confidential revelations made
to those in charge of the bill and cautiously conveyed by them to other members of the Banking and Currency Committee as such should not be publicly
made at this time.

...........

. . ....

I am convinced that this legislation is desirable and I do hope the Senate will pass it as speedily as possible.

...................

I should not interpose the slightest objection in the world to delay if anything
could be acoomplished by delay.
35
The banks were literally engaged in hoarding.

The eXPlana-

tion for this lay in the fact that--while most banks had an abundance of money for normal times--they were frightened by the runs
that had already closed solvent banks.

They had. therefore, re-

duced loans and pressed collection of amounts due.
bank had been threatened with a run.

Almo$t every

Merits of the bill were

ably pointed out by Senator Reed for the benefit of those who we
skeptical:
The great merit of the bill which
the Senator has brought here is not that

35 Oongressional Record, Seventy-second Oongress, second ses
sion, 4054, 4139, 4140.
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it is going to lead to any kind of inflation, it is not that it is going to be
resO~ted to in many cases, but that it
adds to the resources of every bank a new
bunCh of eligibles which, in the eyes of
the banker and the depositors, are actually cash, because they can be converted
into cash at any minute; and it seems to
me the assurance that the bill will bring
to the depositors of the country would
justify the passage of it at a time like
this because we all know, these additional eiigibles that are proposed are just
as good as the United states Government
is good.
36
On February 18 a letter from Secretary of the Treasury Mills
addressed to Senator Vandenburg urged the Senate to pass the bill
which he said "authorizes the use of direct obligations of the
United States as Collateral against Federal Reserve notes.t!

He

stated that every effort must be made to encourage the banks to
resume normal financing of the requirements of trade and industry,
37
without increasing their burden of indebtedness. Repeatedly Senator Glass appealed for pro~pt and favorable action on the bill,
CongresSional Record Seventy-second Con~ress, second ses
sion, 364140.
The AIDeriQan Year Book, 1932, 22.
The bill authorizea-nany Federal Reserve Bank to make adances to banks Within its district when such banks do not have
adequate amounts of assets upon which credit could normally have
een secured. The auproval of five members of the Federal Reserv
Board is necessary ~ Banks receiving such advances are to furnish
time or demand pro~issory notes, and the Federal Reserve Bank is
to charge a rate of one per cent above the regular discount rate.
Federal Reserve Banks applying to the local Federal Reserve Agent
for notes may, until March 3, 1933, with the consent of the major
ity of the Federa~ Reserve Board offer as collateral security
the direct Obligations of the United States Government.1t
37 Congressional Record Seventy-second Congress, second ses
sion, 4232.
~
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.e~1ng Senators "not to delay matters upon technical objection or

trivialities, but to pass this bill and let us relieve the situa38

t1 on • "

Seemingly alert to the need for cooperation to save the coun
try from what appeared to be a real catastrophe and convinced of
tbe need by Senator Glass, the Senate passed the bill without a
dissenting vote.
1932.

It was signed by the President on February 27,

39

Appreciation of the fine non-partisan spirit that was dis-

played in handling this measure was expressed by the President.
Tbe bill, he said, was in a sense a national defense measure.

Of

its major purposes he stated:
By freeing the vast amounts of gold
in our Federal Reserve System (in excess
of the gold reserve required by law) it
so increases the already large available
resources of the Federal Reserve Banks as
to enable them beyond question to meet
any conceivable demands that might be made
on them at home or from abroad. . •
This measure, • . • together with the
additional capital provided for the Federal Land Banks, and the creation of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, will so
strengthen our whole credit structure and
open the channels of credit as now to permit our banks more adequately to serve the
needs of agriculture, industry, and commerce.
40

38 Congressiona1 Record, Seventy-second Congress, second ses
sion, 4140.
39 The American Year Book, 193 2 , 16.

40 State Paners, II, 128.
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Congress grapuled with legislation of many kinds in the re~aining

months of the session, but the major issues dealt with

unemployment relief, government economy, and revenue measures.
Toe cooperation and dispatch displayed by Congress during January
and February in disposing of the emergency items on the President's relief program were noticeably lacking in the months following.

A Congress dominated by political interests made con-

structive and expeditious action difficult and delayed the passage of needed legislation.

There could no longer be any doubt

about what the President wanted.

Conferences with members of bo

Houses, appeals through the medium of the press, and frequent
messages to Congress stressing the need for legislative action
brought only modest accomplishments until signs of another impe
41
ing crisis became apparent late in May.
The attention of the whole country was focused on balancing
the budget by the President's statements to the press and his fre
quent admonitions to Congress.

Now more than ever it seemed im-

perative to balance the budget as a part of the urogram for national recovery.

To the need for additional relief measures the

President called attention in conferences with House and Senate
leaders during the last week in February.

That economies could

be effected in government departments and bureaus was acknowledged, but the question of who would get the credit for it--the
41 Myers, 200, 214.
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legislative or the executive branch--eclipsed the real issue and
au sed unnecessary strain on the relations of the President and
c
42
oongress.
Convinced that action should be taken to provide additional
relief and being opposed to giving federal aid directly to indi~iduals,

the President expressed the belief to House members that

the needs could be met by loans to states at a percentage of the
exPenditures.

Further expansion of the public works program he

deemed inadvisable inasmuch as it was proving too expensive and
large numbers of needy families lived in areas remote from the
public works projects.

43

Federal funds, he believed, should not be

loaned to states unless they showed that conditions warranted su
aid.
The cause of unemployment was championed in the CostiganLaFollette bill which provided an appropriation of $375,000,000-only $1 2 5,000,000 to be spent in the current fiscal year--to be
administered by a Federal Relief Board and distributed for relief

44

of distress to agencies designated by the States.

It was hard to

come to a decision on the basis for distributing the money so tha
the states in greatest need of help would get it.

The passage of

42 The American Year Book, 1932, 18.
Myers, 190, l~
43 Myers, 177.
It was costing over $1200 a year for relief for one family; it would cost $7,200,000 to give relief to 6,000,000 familie
44 Congressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, first session, 3742, 3911.
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thiS bill was urged in letters from the United Mine Workers of
",IDerica, social workers, William Green--president of the American
Federation of Labor--, child welfare workers in various partB of
the country, and from Jouett Shouse, Chairman of the Democratic
National Executive Committee.

In a communication addressed to

senator Wagner, Governor Roosevelt of New York expressed belief
that the bill "WOUld carry out a definite obligation of the Government to prevent starvation and distress in this present crieis."

45

Heated debates ensued over the function of the Federal

Government in rendering assistance to unemployed.

The convicti

of those who were opposed to federal aid were ably presented by
Senator Fess.

The necessity for the Government to take care of

the needs of the people was emphasized by Senators Borah and B
ley.

Referring to a statement of President Hoover, made in Feb-

ruary, 1931, that he would "ask the aid of every resource of the
Federal Government" •

"if the time should ever come that the

voluntary agencies of the country, together with the local and

46

state governments, are unable to prevent hunger and suffering,"
rah said:
• • • the evidence is ample, it is overwhelming, that the time has arrived when
as the President said, if there is suffer-

45 Congressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, first sesSion, 3636, 3739, 3741, 3744 , 3910.

46 See Chapter III, page 80, footnote 39.
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ing and hunger we should take care of it •
• • • From the President down, all agree,
with the exception of the Senator from
Ohio LSenator Fes~7, that if hungry people are amongst us who are not being taken
care of, the Federal Government should take
care of them.
47
The bill was amended so that one-half of the appropriation
should be used for public works to provide employment, but the
bill was defeated in the Senate on February 16 by a vote of forty
eight to thirty-five.

While it was defeated mostly by Democrats,
~

opposition included leaders of both parties.

The President was

opposed to distribution of money to the states on a per capita
basis.

The task of working out a program that would offer some

means of relief to the unemployed was still a major concern of
Congress.
Late in February a gesture was made by the House Economy Com
mittee to reorganize federal bureaus and effect other economies,
but little progress was made.

In March a bill was reported out

by the Ways and Means Committee proposing a cut in Governmen.t expenditures of $125,000,000 to balance the budget and to raise
49
additional revenue of $1,246,000,000 by taxation. The President
indicated that further cuts were necessary and again declared,
47 Congressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, first sesSion, 3671.
48.The American Year~, 1932, 16.
49 Tbid., 1932, 17. The bill known as H. R. 10236, provided
for a 2.~general manufacturers' sales tax exnected to raise
#595,000,000 of the $1,241,000,000 needed to balance the budget,
an increase in income taxes up to a 40% surtax on incomes above
$100,000, a gift tax, amusement taxes, and special excise taxes.

1

"Nothing is more important than balancing the budget with the
50
least increase in taxes." The bill prepared by a Democratic Ways
a.nd Means Committee was an example of what could be accomplished

bY united bipartisan planning, and it was expected that the bill
would be passed with little delay.

But it met with strong oppo-

sition from Democratic members of the House who objected to the
sales tax.
The first opposition being overcome by an urgent appeal f
Secretary of the Treasury Mills for passage of the bill, a new
move was started to defeat the sales tax by a coalition of Demoora,ts and Progressives led by Representative LaGuardia of New Yo
This group began to IItear the bill apart."

Their proposal was to

Ifconscript wealth" by raising surtax rates on incomes above $100,
000 from the snecified maximum of forty per cent to sixty-five
per cent, and by raising the rate on incomes above $8000 from
five per cent to seven per cent.

An effort was made to appease

the opposition by exempting certain farm and medical supplies f
the sales tax.

An amendment was added which increased taxes on

inheritances to a maximum of forty-five per cent on estates of
more than $10,000,000.

On March 24, by a vote of two hundred

twenty-three to one hundred fifty-three, the House struck the

50 Myers, 182.

•
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from the bill.

51

III

II

I,
!!

In a move to find new sources of revenue, import duties were
le~ied

on coal and oil.

Finally, through the efforts of Sneaker

made a simple and patriotic appeal for cooperation, a
compromise measure was agreed upon.
~embers

In his appeal to his House

he explained the fine spirit that prevailed in the prep-

aration of the bill and expressed his firm belief in the principle of freedom of expression, which he said had been extended to
the House on this occasion.

Then he continued:

I appeal to you, not only in the
name of my party but my country, that
in view of the fact that there has been
stricken from this bill more than $500,
000,000 of taxation, it is your duty,
your paramount duty, to help this House
and this committee restore some taxes to
this bill in order that this country's
financial integrity may be maintained.
52
Within the next few days action was taken that restored many features that the original bill, including the forty per cent surtax
increase on incomes above $100,000.

The re-written tax bill was

approved by a vote of 327 to 64 and sent to the Senate on April 1
where it was referred to the Senate Finance Committee.
51 E. Francis Brown, "Congress Wrestles with the Budget,"
rent History, 36:206, 207. May, 1932. This article will be referred to in the succeeding pages as Brown, Current History.
The American Year Book, 1932, 17.
One hundred eight Republicans and forty-five Democrats
voted against the sales tax and in favor of the increase in inheritance and income taxes.
52 Congressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, first session, 7028.
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Serious doubts were expressed by the Secretary of the Treasthat the revenues provided in the bill would balance the budbecause of the uncertainty regarding governmental economies.
The bill, bearing little resemblance to the House measure, was
ported out by Senator Fess of Connecticut on May 9.

Attention of

the Senate was focused on three items in the bill, namely, the
proposal for a sales tax, import duties, and the levying of heavy
income and inheritance taxes were included.

The Senate-revised

bill was sent to a conference of House and Senate members on June
1.

After some opposition, the House approved the amended bill.

The Senate approved it on June 4 by a vote of seventy-two to elev
en and the bill went to the President for his signature.

In spit

of the upheaval in Congress over the measure, the bill in its final form surpassed all expectations.

53

While it did not coincide

in every respect with the wishes of the President, he was satisfied that its passage would give assurance to the country and to
the world that the American people were determined to maintain
their finances and currency on a sound basis.

54

By the middle of March reports indicated that the financial
and economic conditions in the country were improving and that
confidence was

bein~

restored.

The President felt that the Rec

struction Finance Corporation, the Glass-Steagal Bank Bill, the
extension of credit for the Federal Reserve System and the anti-

53 Brown, Current
54 Myers, 219.

Histo~,

36:467.
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boarding campaign had all contributed to restore confidence in the
banks and to relieve economic strain.

Prices of stocks rose about

ten per cent, banks were reopening, and gold was being returned
from its hiding places.

55

By the end of May, however, there were signs of another down~ard

trend in economic conditions, and people were becoming appre-

bensive of the financial status of the country.

The President

felt that the failure of Congress to pass legislation to provide
more revenue and to out government expenses was in part responsible for this new turn of events.

There was a noticeable increase

in hoarding, prices of industrial stocks showed a drop of over
fifty per cent since March, and withdrawal of capital was on the
increase.

Unsettled business oonditions in this country were

causing some trepidation in Europe over the soundness of our financial structure.

The result was an unjustified run on the Amer-

ican dollar by foreign countries.

Fear was expressed that United

56

States would be compelled to abandon the gold standard.
In spite of frequent appeals and proposals from the President,
little progress was made in the reduction of government expendi-

55 Myers, 183. The Republican National Committee weekly let·
ter issued March 31, 1932, reported that Colonel Knox, Chairman
of the Citizens' Reconstruction Organization (the anti-hoarding
organization) declared that dollars were rolling back into employment from under carpets, between mattresses, from cans, trunks,
coffee pots, and safety deposit boxes. A bank in Atlanta, Georgie,
had a #200,000 increase in de~osits since February 1; a business
man in New York transferred '380,000 in gold certificates from a
safety deposit box to his cheoking account.
56. Myers, 214.
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tur es •

The President's recommendation to Congress in April, 1932

tba t a group composed of representatives of the legislative and
executive branches of the government be authorized to frame for
action by Congress a complete national program of economy and s
ges t adequate legislation to carry it out was condemned by Sena
57
Robinson. He attacked the idea of appointing "another commission
and asked that specific recommendations be sent to Congress.

The

resident replied to the challenge by issuing a press statement
in which he outlined three general directions in which expenses
could be reduced, namely--reductions in apnropriations, changes
in laws to permit reduction in expenditures within bureaus and de
partments, and a plan for reorganizing and consolidating of government functions.

He declared that what he asked for was not a

commission but merely that representatives of the two branches
58
rk together on a comprehensive national economy bill. Followthe House Economy Committee did confer with Adnistration officials on two occasions in March and April.

Fi-

Omnibus Economy Bill, H. R. 11267, was worked out which
for a saving of #150,000,000 by cutting the government
yroll through compulsory furloughs--a five-day week for five
ys pay--which was the President's idea.
referred direct salary cuts.

57 State Paners, II, 153.
Myers, 191.
58 state Paners, II, 155.

The House Committee

The President's plan was backed by

141

organized labor and received the support of the Senate.

59

On May 3

the House finally passed the Omnibus Economy Bill with only #30,
000,000 of the $250,000,000 savings which had been recommended by

the President.

The measure for budget balancing was then taken ul

bY the Senate.
The struggle to balance the budget went on through May and
June.

Democratic leaders were blamed for delaying the whole re-

covery program in the hope of "lessening the fortunes of the Pres60

ident and his party in the fall election."

On May 5, 1932 , the

President addressed a message to Congress in which he repeated
that the most essential factor to national recovery was the restoration of confidence.

He condemned the House for rejecting the

revenue programs proposed by the treasury, the program unanimously reported by the Commission on Ways and Means, and for their
IIvirtual destruction" of both the national economy program proposed by the executive officials and the program of the special
House Committee on Economy.

"Nothing is more necessary at this

time than balancing the budget," he told Congress again.

He gave

the details and requirements of the situation which he said were
well known to Congress.

They included pro,pt enactment of a rev-

enue bill and a drastic program of economy to bring about a saving in excess of $700,000,000 a year.

In conclusion he urged

59 The American Year Book, 1932, 18.
60 Myers, 200, 201 •
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courageous action:
• • • let me urge the national necessity
for pro~pt and resolute and unified action keeping constantly in mind the
larger aspects of the problem and that.
the necessity for these measures is born
of a great national emergency. If such
a program should be agreed to by the
leaders and members of both Houses, it
would go far to restore business, employ_
ment, and a~riculture alike.
61

The Senate bill provided for a thirty-day furlough without
instead of a salary reduction of ten per cent which they fi
considered.

Final approval of the bill which would result in an

estimated saving of between !~34,000,000 and $156,000,000 was giv
Senate on June 30.

A cut of $350,000,000 was made in

customary appropriations, but the apprepriations for special ne
called for increases of #848,000,000.

Even with the savings pro-

vided in the bill, it was doubtful if the effort to balance the
budget would be successful.

President Hoover was disapPointed in

the measure and made no effort to conceal his feelings.
indicated and recommended savings of $300,000,000.

He had

Upon signing

the measure he pointed out that it fell short of the economies
proposed by the Cabinet and "imposed unnecessary hardships on gov
ernment employees in minor matters of little consequence economi63
cally." Senator Glass,whose opinions on banking and finance were
valued and who had demonstrated his non-partisanship before,said
on
61 State Papers, II, 180.
62 The American Year Book, 1932, 18.
63 State Paners, II, 216.
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June 9 that the estimates of the Federal Treasury were so "awry"
that it was impossible to pass intelligent revenue legislation.
He also criticized the President for his vacillation and lack of

foresight and courage.

64

The task of providing some form of employment relief was
still before Congress since the plan evolved in the CostiganLaFollette Bill had failed of enactment.

The unemployment situa-

tion had grown steadily worse, and the administration came to
recognize the need for more federal aid.

Early in May the Presi-

dent began holding a series of conferences with congressmen regarding legislation that would grant the full powers originally
asked for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.

Summarily thes

were to make loans to public and semi-public institutions for
construction of reproductive works, to agriculture, to industry

65

for plant modernization, and to create emergency export credits.

This idea was adopted by Democratic Senate leaders as their plan
but contained some unworkable prOVisions.
To expedite matters the President had a conference with Sen-

66

ator Robinson in which some agreement on legislation was reached.
Subsequently a bill embodying some 'of the ideas .of the President
was introduced in the Senate by Senators Wagner, Robinson, Pittman, Walsh, and Bulkley on May 25.

In this bill, S. 4755, to aid

64 Brown, Current History, 36:468.
65 Myers, 204.
66 .IQ1.9.., 204.
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in furnishing relief and work relief to the needy and distressed
people, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was "authorized
and empowered to make grants to the several states
aggregate amount not to exceed $300,000,000."

• in an

It also provided

expenditures for emergency construction on the federal aid high67
way system totaling $120,000,000.
Meanwhile a relief bill had been introduced in the House by
Speaker Garner based largely on the sale of bonds and providing
that #100,000,000 be given to the President to be used as an
emergency fund at his discretion.

A bill providing for a $300,

000,000 relief fund to be loaned to states for needy and distressed people was passed by the Senate and went to the conference committee of both Houses.

Knowing the great need for legis

lation and the eagerness of the House to have a relief measure
passed, the Senate and House conferees, during an eight-day session, strove to reach an agreement that would meet the approval
of all three groups--the Senate, the House, and the Administration.

An agreement was reached which created a total relief bud

get of $2,100,000,000 to be used as follows: $1,500,000,000 to g
to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation for loans to public an

67 Congressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, first ses
sion 11085. The purpose of the bill as written in the Record
was hto provide for grants and loans to the several states, to a
in relieving unemployment, to facilitate the construction of Bel
liquidating projects, to provide for the construction of certain
authorized federal public-works projects and other purposes.
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~nd

private enterprises; $200,000,000 for loans to states for re-

lief on the basis of population; $100,000,000 for loans to states
for relief on the basis of need; and $300,000,000 for constructio

68

of public works.
Before this agreement could be reported out, President Hoove
invited Senate and House leaders to a White House conference on
June 5 to tell them that he would not agree to the plan of the
conferees and to make it clear that if it were accepted he would
veto it.

Bein~

unable to agree on a compromise measure, a smalle

group, selected from the representation of the previous day, met
69
for another conference the following morning. Changes made in th~
bill at the President's conference and reported to the House by
Speaker Garner provided that the Reconstruction Finance Coruoration should have $300,000,000 specifically allocated for loans to
70
states or municipalities. The vote, taken the following day on
this so-called Wagner-Garner Bill, including the conference repor ,
revealed a marked partisan attitude.

It was approved in the

Hous~

by a vote of two hundred two to one hundred fifty-seven and in thE

68 The American Year Book, 1932, 16.
69 Con~ressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, first session, 14684; Those in attendance at the June 5 meeting were
Speaker Garner, the House conferees and Representatives Hawley am
Snell, the Senate conferees and Senators Glass, Robinson, Harris,
Wagner, Reed, McNary, watson and Norbeck, Secretary of the Treasury Mills, Governor Meyer of the Federal Reserve Board, and
Messrs. Jones and McCarthy, directors of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. At the meeting the following day Representatives Garner, Rainey and Snell, and Senators Robinson, Norbeck
and Wagner were in attendance.
70 Ibid., 14684.
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Senate by a vote of forty-three to thirty-one.

71

On July 11 Presi-

..

dent Hoover vetoed the measure, as he had indicated he would,
stating as his major objection the provision giving the Reconstruo
tion Finance Corporation the authority to make loans to individuale, to trusts, estates, partnerships, corporations, and other
~unicipal

and financial groups.

He stated his belief that such a

tprocedure "would place the government in private business, in such
~

fashion as to violate the very principle of public relations

!upon which we have builded our nation." • • • and make the Reconstruction Finance Corporation "the greatest banking and moneyilending institution of all history."

He concluded:

With the utmost seriousness I urge
the Congress to enact a relief measure,
but I cannot approve the measure before
me, fraught as it is with possibilities
of malfeasance and special privileges,
so impractical of administration, so dangerous to public credit, and so damaging
to our whole conception of governmental
relations to the people as to bring far
more distress than it will cure.
72
It was acknowledged by Congress and they had "the President's
~uthority
~he

for it", according to Representative Garner, Speaker of

House, that the country was in worse shape than it had ever

peen.

Definite action was eagerly awaited, not only by members of

71 The American Xear Book, 1932, 16. In the House 166 Demo35 Republicans, and 1 Farm-Laborite voted "yes"; 155 Repub~icans and 2 Democrats voted against the bill.
In the Senate 29
pemocrats, 14 Republicans voted for the bill, while 25 Republicans
5 Democrats, and 1 Farm-Laborite voted "no".
~rats,

72 State Papers, II, 233.
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APPENDIX B
STATEMENT OF PRESIDENT HOOVER ON PRESS RELATIONS

4

The statement of president Hoover regarding press relations,
made in an address before the Gridiron Club, April 13, 1929, was
as follows:
• • • I have found in all the representatives of the press at all times
a desire to be helpful in most unexpected ways. For instance, they daily
assist me beyond my greatest hopes by
their suspicious research in new implications for my most carefully formulated phrases. I discover by the time
an idea of mine bas filtered through the
clear and crystal minds of one hundred
different correspondents, that particular idea throbs with a sense of courage
and public service, that it has sinister
implications, that it is impractical,
that it sDells malevolence, that it is
weak and vacillating, that it is filled
witb personal bias, that it bristles with
idealism, sanity, and progress. When I
take refuge in silence, the gentlemen of
the Press again assist me by the workings
of their own sDeculative minds to the extent of Column I, page 1 • • • --State Papers, I, 27.

I
I
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oongress, but by nearly every individual in the whole country.
~

73

redrafted bill, H. R. 8642, which more nearly resembled the

urged by President Hoover, authorizing a total expenditure of

0

$2,000,000,000--#1,800,000,000 for loans to public agencies for

relief work and self-liquidation projects, and $32 2 ,000,000 for
federal public works--was passed on July 15.

The House provision

for publication of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation loans
was vigorously protested by the President, on the basis that it
cause runs on banks.

The Senate modified it and both Demo-

crats and Republicans stated that, as amended, it required only a
74
confidential communication to the House and Senate.
Heated controversy marked the course of the bill.

Speaker

Garner, the Democratic nominee for Vice-President of United State
openly condemned President Hoover for calling Senate and House
leaders and conferees to the executive mansion to discuss the con
ferees' report before it was reported back to the House and Senteo

Of this action he declared:
I do not think it quite in keeping
with the Constitution or the thought of
the makers of the Constitution as they
fixed the relation between the Executive
and Legislative branch of government • •
• It ought not to be done; and I • • •
protest against it.
75

73 State Papers, II, 233.
74 The American Year Book, 1932, 16.
75 Congressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, first session, 14684.
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senator Goldsborough from Maryland agreed that it was "extremely
unusual" for a President to take it upon himself to notify Congress in advance that he would veto legislation.

He maintained,

"Congress has its responsibility and if it does not please him,
he has his responsibility."

76

The Garner relief plan was referred to by President Hoover
as "the most gigantic pork-barrel ever proposed to the American
Conp:,ress" and as "an unprecedented raid upon the Treasury."
turn, Senator Garner accused the President of
legislation.

spo~soring

In

class

During the White House conference, and later on the

floor of the House, he claimed that the Renublicans pronosed to
consider only a preferential class.

He directed his remarks at

the President and the Republicans in Conp:,ress when he said:
You want to provide this $3,500,000,
000 and • • • hand it to the railroads,
insurance companies, the mortgage companies and similar interests • • • Now in so
dOing, I plead w1.th you to let all the
people have some dripnings from this wonderful banking institution. Do not keep
it just for a few • • • I am through with
class legislation.
77
liThe issue, II he declared, Ilis between the President and Conp:ress. I
Representative Snell voiced the sentiment of the Renublican
House members in his condemnation of Senator Garner's remarks.

H

76 Congressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, first session, 14684.
77 Ibid., 14684.
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accused the House Speaker--"without fear of successful contradiction"--of having made, in his speech, more direct appeal for clas
distinction and class discrimination than had ever been made on
the floor of the House during the session.

He declared that the

issue was not between the President and Congress, but between the
president and the vice-presidential nominee.

He defended the

president's right to ask members of Congress to the White House
to talk matters over, and called attention to the President's
willingness to compromise on Title I of the bill, ithe provision
for $300,000,000 in temporary loans by the R. F. c~7

78

In anticipation of signing the bill, the President remarked
that the obnoxious features had been eliminated, referring to the
provision for loans to states on the basis of population, which hE
termed a "pork-barrel infection,1l and to the provision for establishing a gigantic centralized banking business.

On the whole he

considered the measure a strong step toward recovery.

79

Another last minute action by Congress on one of the items
in the President's relief program was the approving of the Home
Loan Bank Bill on July 16, the day before the adjournment of the
session.

This statute created a system of Home Loan Banks along

78 Congressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, first session, 14687.
79 State Paners, II, 232 236. The major features of the
bill were the provisions for 6300,000,000 in temporary loans by
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to states in need of help
to relieve distress, for $1,500,000,000 in loans by the Reconstruc~
tion Finance Corporation for reproductive construction work of a
public nature, and for broadening the power of the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation to make loans to agriculture.

auL.

150
lines advocated by President Hoover in November, 1931, and
explained in his message to Congress in December of the same

yea~

The bill was introduced on December 10 by Representative Luce in
the House and by Senator watson in the Senate, but opposition led
by Senator Couzens resulted in shelving the bill for about seven
80
months. Opposition still apparent in the final deliberations on
the bill resulted in its being passed without any provision for
an appropriation for carrying it out, thereby rendering it ineffective.

Through a move by Senators Moses and Jones, over the

objections of Senator Couzens, the needed appropriation was voted
as an amendment to a minor House bill at the last minute.
While the bill had moved slowly through committee considerations, mortgages on thousands of homes had been foreclosed which
81
might have been saved had the bill been enacted more promptly.
The President signed it on July 22 and commented that the creatiol
of these institutions did "not involve the government in business
except in the initial work of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation."

He explained:
The purpose • • • is both to meet
the present emergency and to build up
home ownership on more favorable terms
than exist today • • • to renew existing
mortgages with resultant foreclosures

80 Wilbur and Hyde, 439.
81 Myers, 234.
The American Year Book, 1932, 22, 23. The bill created
a system of from eight to twelve regional Federal Home Loan Banks,
with a total capital of $125,000,000 to be initially subscribed b~
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. These banks were authorized to make advances both to member and non-member institutions
and to private individuals who are unable to finance their mortgages through an institution.

sa

151
and great hardships.

82

The policy of artificial expansion of credit by the Federal
Reserve Board was looked upon disapprovingly by President Hoover
from the beginning of his administration.

In his first annual

message to Congress on December 3, 1929, he urged the creation
of a special joint commission of Congressional and administratio
representatives to investigate the whole banking system and recommend legislation.

83

After the collapse of the stock-market, eve

a greater need for reform seemed apparent.

To such a need the

President called attention on numerous occasions after taking of
fice.

On May 5, 1930, a banking bill introduced by Senator Glas

went to the Senate Banking and Currency Committee for consideration.

Later in the month the committee announced that the bill

would not be ready until the next session of Congress, but the
next session from

Decembe~4

1930, to March, 1931, passed and the

bill did not materialize.
In the meantime the depression had entered its second stage
Emergency policies were advanced by the President to save the
I

collapse of the banking system and were gradually dealt with by
Congress, as delineated in the preceding pages of this chapter.
To the need for a revision of the banking laws to safeguard de-

82 State Papers, I, 239.
83 Ibid.
84 Wilbur and Hyde, 333, 334.
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posits, the President called the attention of Congress on Decembe

85

8 and 11, 1931, and again on January 4, 1932.

Frequent meetings

with the Senate Banking and Finance Committee resulted in the introduction of a Banking Reform Bill by Senator Glass on January
22, 1932.

The bill, approved by the President, created a corpor-

ation for loans to expedite liquidation of closed banks, made revision in laws on group bank1ng, gave encouragement ,to branch
banking, placed limits on loans for speculation, and insisted on
membership in the Federal Reserve System.

So much opposition was

expressed by bankers that the measure was returned to the committee for revision.

The outcome was that the first session of the

seventy-second Congress adjourned with no action having been tak-

.

86

en toward the enactment of a sound banking reform bill.
When Congress adjourned on July 17, 1932, with sOIDe exceptions, most of the relief measures had been dealt with to the sat·
isfaction of the President--due to his persistence.

Obviously,

more prompt and complete action by Congress on the measures of an
emergency nature would have alleviated much suffering and have
given greater impetus to the recovery program.

The economic de-

terioration which began in March continued until the middle of
July, when the great depression is considered to have reached its
lowest point.

87

While Congress deliberated on the relief bill, the

85 State Papers, II, 47, 84, 103.
86 Wilbur and Hyde, 337.
87 Myers, 236.
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status of the unemployed grew worse, and their numbers increased.
In the middle of June, estimates by the Department of Labor and
the American Federation of Labor placed the number of unemployed
workers at more than 10,000,000.

European nations had withdrawn

$550,000,000 in gold and large amounts in exchange, hoarding had
88
increased during this period by $500,000,000. Conditions might
have been more serious but for the benefits afforded by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the GlaSS-Steagall Bank Bill
Before the end of July there were encouraging signs of recov
ery in all parts of the world, but in the United States where a
change in national policies was anticipated--pending the outcome
89
of the national election--signs of recovery were less noticeable.
However, the banking situation appeared sounder.

The

withdra~al

of gold from the United States seemed to have stopped, and a smal
amount had returned, the amount of currency in circulation showed
some decrease and the number of bank failures was smaller.

These

encouraging signs of economic recovery were offset somewhat by
discouraging business conditions.

At the end of the first week

in September the steel industry was operating at fourteen and one·
half per cent of capacity, the earnings of industrial and mercantile enterprises showed a noticeable falling off, and the railroads were threatening their employees with a twenty per cent reduction in wages.

Undoubtedly the drop in purchasing power of thE

88 Brown, Current History, 36:584.
89 Myers, 237-8.
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~ass

of the population had a negative effect on industrial recov-

ery.

A report of the National Industrial Conference Board showed

a decrease of twenty-seven per cent in the buying power of the
average worker from June, 1929, to June, 1932.

During the same

~eriod

the cost of living had fallen only twenty-two and three
90
tenths per cent.
From July to November, President Hoover, who had accepted the

Republican nomination for President on August 11, 193 2 , was engaged in campaign activities in anticipation of the election in
~ovember.

To the recovery program, however, he continued'to give

a large share of his time.

A conference of business and industri-

al leaders was held in Washington on August 26, 1932, to hasten
economic recovery.

Business and industrial committees from the

twelve Federal Reserve districts attended the meeting which the
!-president opened with the statement that "the major financial cri ..
sis had been overcome" and • • • "confidence and hope have reappeared."

A six-point program was adopted providing for the dis-

tribution of credit and the spreading of work through shortening
of hours.

This "share-the-work" program was designed to meet the
91
problem of the unemployed millions. The President told this grou~:
The reason for calling this conference at this particular moment is that
we are convinced that we have overcome
90 E. Francis Brown, "Reviving American Confidence," Current
Historv, 37:79, October, 1932.
91 State Paners, II, 268, 269.
Brown, Current History, 37:81
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the major financial crisis--a crisis
unparalleled in the history of the
world--and that with its relaxation
confidence and hope have reappeared
in the world. We are now able to take
further steps in solution of the industrial and agricultural problems with
which we are still confronted.
92
The President continued to stress the need for a sound banking
reform as essential to economic recovery and the restoration of
national confidence.

In a campaign speech at Indianapolis on

October 28, 1932, he called attention to the failure of Congress
to pass this needed legislation when he said:
I recommend to ~he Congress the
sane reform of our banking laws. The
Democratic House of Representatives did
not see fit to pass that legislation in
the last session. I shall persist in
securing its accomplishment.
93
In the election on November 8, 1932, Franklin D. Roosevelt,
the Democratic candidate, was elected President of the United
states.

From this time the people naturally looked to the Presi-

dent-elect for future national policies.

As far as positive in-

fluence on recovery was concerned, the Hoover administration was
over on November 9, yet President Hoover made a last minute effor

94

to bring about the needed banking reform and government economies
In his fourth annual and final message to

Con~ress

on December 5,

1932, he emphasized again the need for reorganization of the gov92 stat~ Paner§, II, 268.
93 Ibid., 389.
94 Wilbur and Hyde, 334.
Myers, 275.
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ernment departments and for a stable improvement in the banking
system.

The Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Federal

Reserve Act, he said, were only remedies--passed in a time of
emergency--to meet a crisis, and could not go on functioning indefinitely.

On this occasion he told the Congress:
• • • widespread banking reforms are a
national necessity and are the first
requisite for further recovery in agriculture and business. They should have
immediate consideration as steps greatly
needed to further recovery.
95

Government finances at the beginning of the short session of
the Seventy-second Congress on December 5 were in a precarious
state.

Taxes imposed had not yielded the revenue estimated by

the Senate and House, and treasury collections had fallen off.
Under the Wagner-Garner bill, prodigious spending resulted in an
increase during the year 1932 of approximately three billion dollars in the gross national debt.

96

The President's budget message

on December 6 laid before Congress the financial situation of the
government and made pronosals for drastic reduction in expenditures and increases in revenues.

Campaign pledges made by the

Democratic party for economy in government and a reduction of fed
eral expenditures gave President Hoover reason to expect cooperation from the Democratic controlled Congress in a program to balance the budget.

Obviously the critical conditions of the neriod

95 State PaDer~, II, 268.
96 Lawrence Sullivan~ Prelude to PaniC, (Washington, D. C.,
The Statesman Press, 1936), 55.
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called for cooperation between the outgoing and incoming administrations if the recovery program was to continue.

In his budget

message President Hoover told Congress:
The great problem before the world •
• • is restoration and maintenance of confidence • • • essential steps in strengthening the foundations for recovery • • • This
all-important objective is definitely within reach, and more determined effort will
bring us to the goal we have been striving
to reach in the face of unparalleled difficulties • • • I cannot too strongly urge
that every effort be made to limit expenditure and avoid additional obligations not
only in the interests of the taxpayer but
in the interests of the very integrity of
the finances of the Federal Government.
97
The bUdget submitted called for net reductions of $580,000,000 in
98
federal expenses for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1933.
The President received much acclaim for his courageous
statesmanship.

Speaker Garner and Democratic Floor Leader Rainey

endorsed the President's recommendations, but nothing happened.
99
No action had been taken up to the time for the Christmas recess.
Meanwhile the President-elect had conferred with Democratic Congressional leaders and plans to balance the budget were set aside
until the calling of the snecial session.

On January 18 the Demo

cratic majority in the House defeated the President's plan for
97 State Paners, II, 576-578.
98 Sullivan, 56. This figure was derived from a plan to
pare the estimate for government department expenses by $830,000,
000 and allow an additional $250,000,000 for anticipated relief
and emergency expenses.
99 Ibid., 58.
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reorganization of government bureaus and reduction of expendi-

100

tures.
On December 8, 1932, the Glass Banking Reform Bill was again
brought to the attention of Congress.

In opening the debate on

the bill January 5, 1933, Senator Glass explained that--after
long investigation--he had concluded that branch banking (the
issue over which there had been so much controversy) was about
the only remedy for the menacing situation facing the banking
community of the United States.

To focus attention on the need

for this legislation, he pointed out that twenty-eight bank failures had occurred in the first week of January, three of them national and twenty-five state banks.

In the previous December--

the month following the election of President Roosevelt--there ha
been one hundred forty-five bank failures, nineteen of which were
national banks and one hundred twenty-six were state banks.

Op-

position to the bill was displayed in the Senate from the beginning.

A filibuster lasting from January 12 to 19, begun by Sena-

tor Huey Long of Louisiana and Senator Thomas of Oklahoma, tried
to prevent action on the bill.

When it was decided to limit de-

bate on the bill, normal debate was continued and the bill was

100 Myers, 275.
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passed by a Senate vote of fifty-four to nine on January 26.
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101

When House leaders refused a hearing on the bill, President Hoover addressed a message to Congress urging the Democratic majority to pass the bill--to reestablish confidence and remedy the
102
organization of our credit system.
But the bill was not passed
until after March 4, 1933.
On January 11, 1933, President Hoover urged Congress to revise the bankruptcy laws to facilitate the adjustment of "inflated" and itunbearable ll debt--a measure which he had previously laid
before Congress on February 29, 1932.

He emphasized the need for

immediate consideration of legislation for the relief of indivi103
dual and corporate debtors as a matter of vital imnortance.
A
bill was passed by the House on January 30, but its passage was
delayed in the Senate.

Another message to Congress on February

20 urging favorable action by the Senate on the House-approved
bill to secure orderly cooperation between creditor and debtor
was sent by the President.

Such a bill was enacted by the Senate

on February 27, which provided means of reducing indebtedness of
individuals and aiding the reorganization of the affairs of rail101 Con~ressional Record, Seventy-second Congress, second
session, 133 , 1404, 1405, 1406, 1624.
The bill S. 4412 provided for the safer and more effective use of the assets of the Federal Reserve Banks and of nation
al bank associations to regulate inter-bank control, to prevent
the undue diversion of funds into speculative operations and for
other purposes.--Congressional Record, Seventy-second Congress,
second session, 1336.
102 State Papers, II, 597.
103 Myers, 323.
Brown, Current History, 37:723.
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10
roads but excluding the provision for corporate reorganization.
The failure of

Oon~ress

to approve the economy measures

recommended by the President and the needed banking reform bill
did incalculable harm to the recovery program and contributed in
large part to the uneasiness over the financial situation in the
country following the November election.

The situation was fur-

ther aggravated when the House passed a resolution on January 4,
1933, to publish all loans made by the Reconstruction Finance
Oorporation prior to July 21, 1932.

This publication of loans to

banks that had been considered sound induced runs on banks and
encouraged hoarding of currency and gold.

An appeal from the

President for the repeal of this procedure because it was
ing the usefulness and effectiveness of the Reconstruction Financ
Oorporation and exaggerating fears proved unavailing.

Apprehen-

sion over the soundness of the banks spread and caused more harm
to the financial structure already weakened from the fear of cur-

IOS

rency inflation.
Consideration of currency inflation bills by the Democratic
House in the previous session of Congress gave rise to some speculation in the public mind regarding the attitude of the incoming
administration toward inflation.

On being asked to make clear

his position with regard to the gold standard, the President104 Myers, 324.
105 Il2.1J1.
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elect, a few days before the election in November, evasively
stated that "sound money is an international necessity not a do106
J'
mes ti c cons id eration for one coun t rYe "
This attitude, as well
as the fact that his close associates were known to favor currencJ
manipulation, gave rise to apprehension over the monetary policieE
of the incoming administration.

Concern over the fate of the gola

standard spread quickly after the election and gave rise to unprecedented withdrawals and demands on banks for gold.

Many peo-

ple, in an effort to protect themselves, began to invest in foreign securities.

According to close associates of President Hoo-

ver, this so-called "flight of the dollar" ran into unprecedented
107
figures.
Realizing before the end of January that the country was
heading for a panic, the President worked ceaselessly to ward off
108
a national disaster.
During the period prior to January 18, 193~,
gold had been returning to this country from abroad.

The "flip;ht

of the dollar" reversed this situation after the week of January
18.

During the period of January 18 to February 1, $38,000,000

of gold was marked for European countries.

From the first of Feb-

ruary to the middle of the month withdrawal of currency and gold
for hoarding increased from about $5,000,000 a day to $15,000,000
106 Myers, 347.
107 Joslin, 352.
108 Ibid.
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109
a day.

Since there was no pressure for gold from abroad, it was

clear that its flight was due to the domestic financial situation.

When it appeared that fear of a change in currency was ap

proaching the panic stage, President Hoover addressed a letter to
President-elect Roosevelt on February 17, 1933, asking him to
"clarify the public mind on certain essentials which will give
renewed confidence."
The reply from the President-elect, received twelve days
later on March 1, 1933, expressed concern over the gravity of the
situation but stated that he doubted that a general statement
would have a definite effect.

The President and his advisers

thought that a statement from the President-elect would provide
some basis for cooperation in mapping a course that would protect
110
the interests of the public--irrespective of politics.
Some form of legislation, it was felt, was necessary to control temporarily the situation.

Such a course was contemplated,

but no legislation could be achieved without the cooperation of
the Democratic-controlled Congress--and they had already demonstrated their reluctance to take action on issues affecting national welfare without the approval of the Democratic Presidentelect.

That this was the case was verified at a White House con-

109 Myers, 334.
110 Ibid., 345.
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ference with Senate leaders on March 2, 1933.

President Hoover

called Senators Robinson and Glass to the White House to discuss
possibilities of legislative action.

After giving the matter

careful consideration, the senators concluded that it was useles
to attempt to get any legislative action in Congress independent
111
of the President-elect.
With this decision it appeared that th
last hope of averting a crisis was removed.

111 Myers, 361-363.
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APPENDIX A
ADMINISTRATIVE POSITIONS HELD BY HERBERT HOOVER
DURING WORLD WAR I

I

I'

When the World War broke out in July, 1914, Herbert Hoover
and his family were residing in London where he was engaged at
the time as consultant engineer in large mining operations.

Wher;

the task of organizing relief work in Belgium was undertaken,
United States Ambassador to England, Walter H. Page, and the Belgian authorities formally asked Mr. Hoover to take charge of the
work, if satisfactory diplomatic arrangements 'could be made with
United States and Germany.

This done, Hoover became the active

head of the American Commission for Relief in Belgium, with the
title of chairman, on October 22, 19l4--a position he held all
through the war and for several months of the armistice period.
At the request of President Wilson, he returned to Washington on May 3, 1917, to begin making plans for the administration
of American food.

On August 10, 1917, he was appointed United

States Food Administrator and began the important work of food
conservation as provided in the Food Control Act passed by Congress on the same day.

This work centered largely around the

curtailment of profiteering and speculation during the war emergency.

Demobilization of the Food Administration was begun the

day after the Armistice was signed, it being the belief of Hoover
that all such legislation, except in war time, tends to strike
at the roots of individual initiative.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. . . . . ._

....
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Ten days after the Armistice he left for Paris, again at the
request of President Wilson, to direct the participation of the
United States in the urgently needed relief of the war-ravaged
countries of Eastern Europe.

For the direction of this work he

was appointed Director General of the American Relief Administration.

It is believed by one closely associated with him in this

work during the first eight months after the Armistice that it
was owing more to the superhuman efforts of Hoover than to any
other single factor that complete disorder, anarchy, and Bolshevik domination in Eastern Europe were averted. -- Vernon Kellogg,
Herbert Hoover, the Man and His Work (New York: D. Appleton and
Company, 1920), 102-123; 198-2 55; 267.
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APPENDIX C
HOW THE DEBENTURE PLAN WOULD OPERATE
As an instance of how the debenture plan would work, Senato
Caraway cited the following example in his speech before the Senate on June 14, 1929:
Congress has said that wheat is entitled to a tariff duty of forty-two cents
per bushel in order to equalize the cost
of producing in America and in other countries where the standards of living were
lower and, therefore the cost of living
less than here. Since a large quantity of
wheat has to be shipped abroad for a market and the price for which it sells fixes
the market price for the time being of
wheat in America, the debenture plan provided that, for every bushel of wheat sold
abroad, the farmer should receive the world
price, plus twenty-one cents a bushel, that
being one-half the tariff rate. -- Congressional Record, Seventy-first Congress, first session, 2884.
Thus the farmer would be given what amounts to a bounty on
the farm product he exports--such bounty amounting to one-half
the duty that would be paid on the same product if imported into
this country.

At the port of shipment he would be given a certi-

ficate called a "debenture ll of the face value of one-half the import duty.

If he exported one thousand bushels of grain, he

would get the world price plus twenty-one cents on each bushel or
two hundred ten dollars in addition to the price he got for his
wheat.

This certificate could be sold to a customs' broker or

importer, at a discount of say five per cent, to be used by him
in payment of import duties. -- Ibid.
New York Times, June 10, 1929.
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APPENDIX D
CAUSES OF THE STOCK-MARKET COLLAPSE IN 1929
Economists disagree to some extent over the conditions responsible for the collapse of the stock market in October, 1929.
The belief is generally held that the fundamental causes lay in
the unstable economic and financial conditions in the wake of
World War I.

In the post-war years the nations were confronted

with problems of adjusting to

chan~ed

economic, political and

financial conditions involving international relations, in which
reparations and war debts were a major item.

Intergovernmented

debts of combatant nations had climbed to over $50,000,000,000,
including war loans and reparations.

The war had been financed

by inflation or credit, and private debts had been piled up on
these inflated values.
In the United States alone there were signs of sound economic recovery reflected in increased prosperity of the people.

It

is thought by some economists that the years from 1922 to 1929
should be called a period of expansion rather than of prosperity.
Numerous changes in industrial technology noticeably affected
economic and industrial conditions.

MeChanical processes reduced

operating costs and increased output, but prices were not reduced
as fast as costs, and profits of industrial corDorations rose beyond normal needs.

Some of,the profits went into eXDansion and

some into surplus reserves.

More prosperous corporations loaned

large sums to Stock Exchanp;e speculators and to foreign countries

169
These forms of profit distribution led to further increased production and inflation of capital values.

But the newly produced

goods required consumers--and wages had not kept pace with production.
Overproduction that resulted, installment buying, weaknesses
in our banking system, and false expansion of credit are looked
upon as the immediate causes for the stock market collapse.

Larg

amounts of European capital and gold were sent to United states
becauseiof unstable conditions abroad.

The false prosperity thus

created and the inflation policy undertaken by the Federal Reserve System resulted in mass speculation unprecedented in our
history. --Myers, 4-10.

Rexford G. Tugwell, "Flaws in the Hoover

Economic Plan," Current History, 35: 5 2 5-5 2 7, January, 1932.
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